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As a constitutional principle embodied in Article VI of the U.S.
Constitution, supremacy instructs the judicial department to uphold
federal law and ignore conflicting state law. Likewise, though primacy
of EU law was not expressly recognised in the EC Treaty' (now replaced
by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which
is also silent in this respect 2) this circumstance did not prevent the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) from introducing this principle into the
1. Treaty Establishing the European Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 2006 O.J. (C 321)
E/37 (Consolidated Version), available at http:l/eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2006:32 1E:0001:0331 :EN:PDF.
2. Case 6/64, Costa v. E.N.E.L., 1964 E.C.R. 585. Although Article 1-6 of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Oct. 29, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 1,
embedded this principle, the Treaty of Lisbon, is again silent. See Treaty of Lisbon, Dec.
13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1. The Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on Dec. 1, 2009.
It has amended the Treaty on European Union and replaced the EC Treaty with the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). See Consolidated Versions of
the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
2008 O.J. (C 115) 1. However, please note that the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon affects neither the content of the provisions of the EC Treaty nor the case law of
the ECJ that are mentioned in the present contribution.
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newly created EU legal order. Not only has primacy been interpreted,
along with direct effect, 3 as the foundational constitutional principle, 4 but
primacy has also become a legal basis bestowing national courts with all
necessary powers to set aside conflicting national laws.5 It follows from
the foregoing that both the EU 6 and the U.S. legal orders mandate the
judicial department to ensure that infringing states do not contest that
federal law is "the supreme law of the land." To this effect, there is an
essential linkage between this principle and the constitutional law of
remedies. 7 The perspective adopted to characterise this linkage will
determine how much remedial power must be granted to the judiciary for
it to accomplish its constitutionally assigned mission. 8 On the one hand,
one may argue that supremacy is only ensured where there is a judicial
remedy for every violation of a federal right. Thus, compliance with the
maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium conditions the supremacy of federal law.
Said differently, failure to provide an adequate remedy erodes the
supremacy of federal law. On the other hand, one may consider that
even if there is not always an available remedy for every violation of a
federal right, the supremacy of federal law is ensured in so far as states
remain bound by the rule of federal law. Allowing a certain degree of
infringement does not deprive federal law of its supremacy. Rather, it
gives equal importance to other constitutionally protected interests, such
as the role played by states in the federal design, which may advise
against granting judicial relief. Put simply, supremacy of federal law
cannot be construed as an absolute remedial grant, but its supreme
character is apprehended by weighing it against other constitutional
principles.
By determining the availability of monetary relief against states for
violation of federal or EU law, this article aims at determining which of
the two aforementioned perspectives has been followed by the United
3. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Neth. Inland Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1.
4. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN
LAW (2d ed. 2001).
5. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finaze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
1978 E.C.R. 629.
6. For the sake of clarity, the terms "European Union" (EU), and "Europe" are used
as synonyms. For an introduction to the constitutional structure of the European Union,
see generally GRAINNE DE BURCA & PAUL CRAIG, EU LAW, TEXT, CASES & MATERIALS
(4th ed. 2007) and KOEN LENAERTS & PIET VAN NUFFEL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE
EU (2d ed. 2004).
7. MONICA CLAES, THE NATIONAL'S COURT MANDATE IN THE EUROPEAN
CONSTITUTION 97-119 (2006).
8. R. Fallon Jr. & D. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1788-90 (1991) (holding that claims in damages are
only one of the many possible avenues to ensure that public authorities comply with
federal law).
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States Supreme Court and the ECJ respectively.
In contrast to
declaratory or injunction relief, monetary relief is more intrusive into
state sovereignty. While a declaratory judgment or enjoining state action
may seem sufficient measures in themselves to restore the legality of a
federal system, awarding damages goes to the heart of states' financial
dignity. Hence, monetary relief is the optimal example to compare the
reach of the principle of supremacy in the United States and of primacy
in the European Union. The article unfolds as follows. Section I is
devoted to studying the principle of state sovereign immunity under the
U.S. Constitution, in particular, its increasing constitutional importance.
Once limited by the wording of the Eleventh Amendment, the U.S.
Supreme Court now derives this principle from "fundamental postulates
implicit in the constitutional design." 9 As a result, state sovereign
immunity has become an important limitation on Congress, which may
only rely on its limited Fourteenth Amendment powers and the
Bankruptcy Clause to award damages. Monetary relief has been almost
precluded. However, the U.S. Supreme Court considers that alternative
remedies are sufficient to secure the supremacy of federal law, namely,
suits brought by the Federal Government, the Ex parte Young'° doctrine,
and monetary relief against state officials. In Section II, the principle of
state liability for damages under EU law is explored. In describing its
harmonious evolution from Francovich" to Krbler,12 it will be asserted
that state liability for damages has developed into a general principle by
which the ECJ merged the concepts of primacy and judicial protection.
Section III argues that both structural differences and an attitude towards
state financial implications explain why both courts give a different
answer to the same question.' 3 While in the U.S. the federal legislature
9. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 709, 729 (1999).
10. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
11. Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. I5357.
12. Case C-224/01, K6bler v. Republik Osterreich, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10239.
13. This is not the first time that a comparative study on this topic is undertaken.
Although previous contributions provide an excellent overview and reveal interesting
insights, they do not focus on the interplay between the principle of supremacy and the
law of remedies. In contrast, this last aspect is central to this contribution. For a previous
studies, see James E. Pfander, Member State Liability and ConstitutionalChange in the
United States and Europe, 51 AM. J.COMP. L. 237 (2003). The author posits that different
federation-building dynamics in the United States and in the EU explain the two Courts'
approaches. Id. at 240. In trying to complete the European project, the ECJ has adopted a
more assertive stand towards integration. Id. Conversely, in a mature and consolidated
federal system, such as the one in the United States, the same approach is not needed. See
id. at 240-41. In particular, whereas in the EU the accession of new states is seen as a
source of legitimacy for the evolving jurisprudence on federalism, the same does not hold
true in the United States. Id. See also Daniel J.Meltzer, Member State Liability in Europe
and the United States, 4 INT'L J.CONST. L. 39 (2006) (explaining why both Courts have
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may not command either the state executive or legislature, liability for
damages was born in the EU as a reply to the non-implementation of
Directives. Additionally, in extending the principle of state liability, the
ECJ pays little attention to the possible financial implications upon the
member states. On the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court only accepts
monetary implications on the state treasuries when prospective relief is
seen as necessary to ensure the supremacy of federal law. Finally, it is
concluded that while the primacy of community law is seen through the
lens of judicial protection, the U.S. Supreme Court considers that for the
federal law to be supreme, it is not always necessary to have an effective
remedy.
1.

THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF STATES UNDER U.S.

LAW
A.

Concept

In the American federal system, each state is a sovereign entity.
Since it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to suit
without consent, 14 the principle of sovereign immunity of states implies
that both federal and state courts lack jurisdiction in cases where an
individual files a suit against a non-consenting state. 15 Thus, this
principle operates as a limit to the judicial enforcement of individual
rights.
States' consent is a relevant factor in determining the scope of the
sovereign immunity of states. The more states' consent is deemed given,
the less immune from suits states will be. Besides, since this principle is
"a personal privilege [of states] which may be waived at pleasure," 16 the
number of cases in which it is applicable varies from one state to the
taken opposite paths and relying on a cluster of differences, including the factual
circumstances of the respective seminal cases, contrasting historical settings, diverging
common-law and civil law traditions, stronger political checks in the EU to control
unwelcomed EU legislation, alternative mechanisms for the enforcement of federal law in
the United States, and a more intensive political scrutiny in appointing federal judges in
the United States); Aman Pradhan, Rethinking the Eleventh Amendment: Sovereign
Immunity in the United States and the European Union, 11 N.Y.U. J.LEGIS. & PUB.
POL'Y 215 (2008) (arguing that, because the principle of sovereign immunity is not
consistent with popular sovereignty, cooperative governance and state autonomy, the
U.S. Supreme Court should abandon this principle and embrace a Francovich-like
approach).
14. Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).
15. This principle originates from the old English maxim according to which "the
King can do no wrong." See id. at 12-13 (quoting Alexander Hamilton in THE
FEDERALIST No. 18, which reads as follows: "It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty
not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent").
16. Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447-48 (1883).
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other.
However, the U.S. Supreme Court has introduced some
uniformity in its application. First, regarding suits brought by the United
States or one of its individual states, the U.S. Supreme Court has
understood that such consent was given when each state joined the
17
Union. Hence, federal courts have jurisdiction to rule in these cases.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected the doctrine of
"constructive waiver" whereby a state engaged in a federally regulated
commercial activity authorising private suits has implicitly waived its
immunity.' 8 Instead, an unequivocal statement is now required.1 9 As a
result, notwithstanding the cases in which the United States or other
states are the plaintiffs, states' waivers cannot be presumed. Even if a
state interacts in the market with private undertakings, state immunity is
preserved. Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the
principle of sovereign immunity in very broad terms. 20 Not only are
states immune while carrying out acts of government (jus imperii), but
they also carry immunity when operating in the market (jus gestionis).2'
B.

Legal Basis of State Sovereign Immunity

The principle of sovereign immunity of states and the enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment have been closely related. The Eleventh
amendment is the result of a political dissent against the U.S. Supreme
Court ruling in Chisholm v. Georgia.22 There, a South Carolina citizen
sought to recover from Georgia the payments overdue for the goods
supplied during the American Revolution. Nevertheless, Georgia argued
that it was sovereign, and thus, not liable to such action. The U.S.
17. U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621 (1982).
18. See Parden v. Terminal R.R. Co., 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
19. Coll. Sav. Banks v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 682 (1999).
20. For a view against this proposition, see Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After
Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REv. 793, 832 (1998). The author holds that the U.S.
Supreme Court has hopelessly confused the doctrine of implied waiver and the doctrine
of abrogation. See id. at 795. Accordingly, by rescuing this distinction, she supports the
constitutionality of federal statutes passed under the spending clause that condition
obtaining federal funds to states' waiver of their immunity, as well as federal regulated
activities passed under Article I in which states voluntarily engage. See id. at 795-96.
21. The scope of states' immunity under American constitutional law is even wider
than the one normally accepted under public international law pursuant to which, whilst a
foreign state is pursuing a commercial activity, the latter cannot invoke its immunity,
See, e.g., G.A. Res. 59/38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004); see also Laura
Gardner, State Employers Are Not Sovereign: Transfer the Market ParticipantException
to the Dormant Commerce Clause to States as Employers, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV 725
(2004) (arguing that the market-participant exception to dormant commerce clause
challenges should be extrapolated to cases under the Eleventh Amendment where states
act as employers),
22. Chisholm v. Ga., 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
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Supreme Court rejected Georgia's arguments and held that Article III of
the U.S. Constitution 23 empowered the federal judiciary to rule on
proceedings brought by individuals against states.
States were heavily indebted in the aftermath of the Revolution,
which meant that the Chisholm ruling filled States with consternation.24
The fear of insolvency prompted the states to seek for constitutional
reform, which led to the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment. The
Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: "The judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by25
citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.
If one relies on the literal reading of the Eleventh Amendment, it could
be argued that the latter only bars diversity jurisdiction, that is, suits
brought by out-of-state citizens. Accordingly, citizens could still be
entitled to sue their own state.26 Nevertheless, following Hans v.
Louisiana,27 the current opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court is precisely
the opposite. Proceedings brought by a citizen against its own state are
also barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Although the Hans decision
does not modify the original understanding of the U.S. Constitution, it
overrules the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm. Moreover, in
Alden v. Maine,28 Justice Kennedy, writing for the U.S. Supreme Court,
held that the doctrine that a sovereign state could not be sued without its
consent was universal in the states when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified. 29 He reasoned that this principle has been embraced by the U.S.
Constitution since its creation. 30 Justice Kennedy also stressed that had
the U.S. Constitution provided that states could be sued in their own
courts and by their own citizens, it would not have been ratified. 3' Thus,
the Eleventh Amendment does not define by itself the principle of
23. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 ("The judicial power shall extend ... to
controversies... between a state and citizens of another state . .
24. Alden, 527 U.S. at 720.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
26. See Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1429
(1987). The author argues that the principle of sovereign immunity should be limited to
diversity cases. See id. at 1427. Thus, when exercising federal question jurisdiction,
states may not rely on their immunity. Id. In the same vein, see William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REv. 1003 (1983). However, the problem with this theory is that the Eleventh
Amendment refers to "any suit." See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the
Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1342 (1989).
27. Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890).
28. Alden, 527 U.S. at 706.
29. Id. at 715-16.
30. Id. at 720.
31. Id. at 727.
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sovereign immunity of states. On the contrary, it simply emphasizes the
importance of such principle in the American constitutional design. In
other words, as the U.S. Supreme Court held in Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, "we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so
much for what it says, but for the presupposition which it confirms. 32
Therefore, the principle of sovereign immunity of states as a
constitutional principle is not framed by the wording of the Eleventh
Amendment. As a result, one may infer four direct implications.
First, the principle can be extended beyond the wording of the
Eleventh Amendment. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has done so. In
particular, in Hans v. Louisiana,3 3 Smith v. Reeves,3 4 Principality of
Monaco35 and Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak36 the U.S. Supreme
Court respectively held that states' immunity was applicable to
proceedings brought by citizens against their own states, federal
corporations, foreign nations, and Indian tribes. However, the principle
of sovereign immunity is not applicable to political subdivisions of the
state, such as cities, counties, and towns, which can be sued in a federal
37
court.
The reason is that unless they are the "arm or alter ego of the
State," local corporations are considered "citizens" of the state where
they are formed.38
The second implication is that the principle of sovereign immunity
stands on an equal footing with other constitutional principles, such as
the supremacy of federal law. In order to determine the current position
occupied by the principle of immunity in the American constitutional39
landscape, two cases must be examined: Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
4°
and its subsequent overruling in Seminole Tribe v. Florida.
In Union
Gas, the federal government, which had partially covered the expenses
for the clean-up at Brodhead Creek, sued Union Gas claiming that it was
responsible for the environmental disaster.4' Union Gas filed a third
party claim against Pennsylvania, arguing that in accordance with federal

32. See Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996).
33. Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. See Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900).
35. See Principality of Monaco v. Miss. , 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
36. See Blatchford v. Native Viii. ofNoatak , 501 U.S. 775 (1991).
37. See Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. 118 (1869); see also Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). This an important limit of
sovereign immunity, given that local governments are in charge of providing a broad
array of public services, such as primary and secondary education, housing or law
enforcement. See Meltzer, supra note 13, at 45.
38. See Cowles, 74 U.S. at 120.
39. Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
40. Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
41. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 13.
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law, Pennsylvania should share responsibility.4 2 Relying on the Eleventh
Amendment, Pennsylvania replied that Congress did not have power
under Article I to abrogate states' immunity. 43 However, the U.S.
Supreme Court disagreed. While acting within the scope of its plenary
powers under Article I (in the case at issue, it was the Commerce
Clause), Congress could fashion statutes enabling individuals to claim
damages against states for breach of federal law. 44 In accordance with
the Court's opinion, "the states surrendered a portion of their sovereignty
when they granted the Congress the power to regulate commerce, and
that by empowering Congress to regulate commerce, the states
surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in the way
of such regulation. 4 5 Consequently, "the power to regulate interstate
commerce would be
incomplete without the authority to render states
46
damages.
in
liable
However, in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,47 the U.S. Supreme Court
felt "bound to conclude that Union Gas was wrongly decided, and that it
should be, and now is, overruled. ' '48 In Seminole Tribe, Congress had
passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) by which states were
required to negotiate with Indian tribes a compact. 49 The IGRA also
granted Indian tribes the right to start proceedings against states which
failed to perform this duty. 50 The same conflicting arguments as the ones
exposed in Union Gas were repeated by the parties. The Seminole Tribe
recalled Union Gas, arguing that under Article I of the Constitution (the
Indian Commerce Clause), Congress is empowered to abrogate state
immunity from suits by individuals. 51 Florida, on the other hand, argued
that Congress lacked such power.52 The U.S. Supreme Court sided with
Florida, holding that "Article I cannot be used to circumvent
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction." 3 When
states have surrendered their competences in a particular subject matter
to the federal legislature, this does not imply per se that the federal
judiciary has jurisdiction over claims brought by individuals against
states. Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court draws a distinction between

42.
43.

Id.
Id.

44.

Id. at 13-14.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 14.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. at 19-20.
Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Id. at 66.
Id. at 47.

50. Id.
51. Id.
52.
53.

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
Id. at 72-73.
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transfers of competence to the federal legislature and transfers of
jurisdiction to federal judiciary. The former does not imply inter alia the
latter. In fact, it is only the U.S. Constitution, and not Congress by
enacting federal statutes, that is capable of empowering the federal
judiciary with jurisdiction over claims brought by individuals against the
state. It clearly appears from the rationale of the case that the principle
of states' immunity has a constitutional character. Likewise, in Alden v.
Maine,54 state employees sought compensation from Maine before its
own state court, alleging that it had breached the Fair Labor Standard Act
(adopted under the Commerce Clause).55 While the petitioners argued
that the principle of supremacy of federal law, embodied in Article VI of
the Constitution, by necessity overrides the sovereign immunity of the
states, Maine invoked its immunity as a sovereign State.56 The U.S.
Supreme Court agreed with Maine and held that "when a State asserts its
immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but the
implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the sovereign
immunity of the States. 5 7 It seems, therefore, that in accordance with
the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion, state liability is outside the scope of
supremacy of federal law. In other words, in order to preserve federal
law as the "supreme law of the land," it is not necessary to render
infringing states liable for damages caused to individuals.
The third implication is that since the principle of sovereign
immunity of states has a constitutional ranking, exemptions from this
principle are only possible if the U.S. Constitution allows for it. So far,
the U.S. Supreme Court understands that Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment 58 and the Bankruptcy Clause 59 under Article I are the only
constitutional provisions empowering Congress to fashion statutes
capable of removing immunity from states.6 °
In City of Boerne v. Flores,61 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that
Section 5 does not extend to general powers to legislate, but only covers
corrective legislation.62 First, it may be invoked to provide remedies
against state laws or actions which (or are likely to) infringe the Due
54. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
55. Id. at 711-12.
56. Id. at 731.
57. Id. at 732.
58. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that, because the
Fourteenth Amendment shifted the federal-state balance to the benefit of the Union,
Section 5 empowers Congress to adopt "by appropriate legislation" measures that ensure
state compliance with the due process and equal protection of the laws, even if this entails
a restriction upon state sovereignty).
59. See Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
60. Alden, 527 at 731-33.
61. City ofBoeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
62. Id. at 519.
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Process and Equal Protection Clause.63 Second, in order to discern
between substantive measures and enforcing measures, only the latter
being allowed under Section 5, the U.S. Supreme Court will apply a
proportionality and congruence test by which a connection "between the
injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end" is
necessary. 64 In this sense, the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out that
sunset clauses, geographic restrictions or egregious predicates are not
required, but these or similar limitations would tend to ensure that
congressional legislation is proportionate. 65 Finally, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the proportionality and congruence tests are not
applicable in abstracto.66 On the contrary, "the appropriateness of
remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented.
Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted
response to another, lesser one.', 67 For instance, in Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Education Expense Board. v. College Savings Bank,6 8 a
private company, College Savings Bank, brought a patent infringement
claim against Florida Prepaid, a company belonging to Florida.69 The
plaintiff based its claim on the Patent Remedy Act (PRA), which had
been passed by Congress to put an end to constant infringements
committed by state related companies. 70 Florida argued that the PRA
was unconstitutional because it infringed the principle of sovereign
immunity of states.7 '
College Savings Bank countered Florida's
argument by alleging that under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
the PRA complied with the Constitution and thus, could abrogate states'
immunity. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld Florida's arguments.73 It
stated that the Due Process Clause does not protect the deprivation of
property alone, but the deprivation of property without due process of
law.74 Since Congress had failed both to prove that state remedies for
patent infringement were questionable and to limit federal claims to such
cases, its reliance on Section 5 did not comply with the Constitution.75
From these and similar cases, it seems that the proportionality test under
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
(1999).
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 517.
Id. at 519-520.
Id. at 533.
City ofBoerne, 521 U.S. at 529-30.
Id. at 530 (citations omitted).
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
Id. at 630.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Fla. PrepaidPostsecondaryEduc. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 634.
Id. at 643.
Id. at 639-48.
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Section 5 is a very strict one.76 Indeed, reliance on Section 5 is limited,
on the one hand, to remedying or preventing unconstitutional behaviour
and, on the other hand, to the absence of state remedies. Hence, the U.S.
Supreme Court has added a subsidiarity test to the proportionality and
congruence ones.7 7

In Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 78 the U.S. Supreme
Court held that under the Bankruptcy Clause, states could not rely on
their immunity to avoid complying with transfer recovery proceedings.79
The U.S. Supreme Court based the "Bankruptcy Clause" exception on
two grounds. First, historical evidence shows that the Framers wanted to
put an end to the problems caused by disparities of state legislation,
which prevented debtors from being finally discharged. 80 Thus, the U.S.
Supreme Court considered that during the constitutional ratification
process, states were aware of the importance of harmonizing bankruptcy
law, even if it entailed subordinating their immunity to this "pressing
goal. 81 Second, since bankruptcy jurisdiction is in rem,82 the impact on
states' immunity is only ancillary.8 3 The U.S. Supreme Court took the
view that under the Bankruptcy Clause, Congress was granted the power
to regulate the entire "subject of Bankruptcies., 84 Bankruptcy courts are
therefore entitled to issue ancillary orders necessary to enforce their in
rem adjudication. This means that they have the power to avoid
preferential transfers and to recover the transferred property, regardless
of the third-party withholding it. Thus, if the res is being held by a state,
the latter must return it to the bankruptcy trustee.
76. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents , 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356 (2001). Yet, it does not follow that it is an insurmountable obstacle when
fundamental rights are involved. See Nev. Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S 721
(2003); see also Tenn. v. Lane , 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
77. For a U.S.-EU comparative study on the application of the principle of
proportionality to legislative measures, see George Bermann, Proportionality and
Subsisdiarity, in 75 THE LAW OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET (Catherine Barnard &
Joanne Scott eds., 2002) (holding that the proportionality test applied by the U.S.
Supreme Court in examining legislation adopted under the Fourteenth Amendment is
stricter than the one applied by the ECJ in evaluating the validity of EU measures).
78. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
79. Id. at 362-63.
80. Justice Stevens, who delivered the opinion of the U.S. Supreme Court, referred
to two pre-constitutional cases, namely, James v. Allen, 1 Dal. 188 (CP Phila. City 1786)
and Millar v. Hall, 1 DalI. 229 (Pa. 1788). These cases showed that even if a debtor was
discharged in one state and had debts in other states, he could be arrested for nonpayment in the latter. See also Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440
(2004).
81. Katz, 546 U.S. at 362.

82. Jurisdiction "in rem" means that bankruptcy trustees are empowered to recovery
the property of the insolvent debtor resulting from preferential transfers.
83.

Katz, 546 at 391.

84.

Id. at 377.
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The question that then arises is what differentiates the Bankruptcy
Clause from other Article I legislative powers. Unfortunately, the U.S.
Supreme Court did not provide a clear answer. Some scholars argue that
no persuasive argument can support such distinction.8 5 Conversely, it is
also noted that congressional powers under the Bankruptcy Clause are
greater than under other clauses of Article 1.86 The term "uniform" is
only present in the Bankruptcy Clause, suggesting a greater grant of
power.
Indeed, it is suggested that Congress enjoys exclusive
competence in the field of bankruptcies and consequently, sovereign
immunity has been surrendered.8' Likewise, by contrast to Seminole,88
Alden 89 and Florida Prepaid,90 in Katz9' Congress did not rely on its
legislative powers to create an action in personae against the states, but
in rem. 92 Arguably, the unique nature of the bankruptcy power may be
sufficient to merit a different treatment. In any case, the U.S. Supreme

Court did not overrule Seminole Tribe. Rather, the U.S. Supreme Court
seems willing to accept an incidental limitation on states' immunity.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court has applied the principle of
sovereign immunity not only in proceedings before federal courts, but
also before state courts. In Alden v. Maine,93 after recalling its previous
decision in Seminole Tribe,94 the U.S. Supreme Court justified the
expansion of this principle to state fora by stressing that "a congressional
power to authorize private suits against non-consenting states in their
own court would be even more offensive to state sovereignty than a
power to the suits in a federal forum." 95 The principle of sovereign
immunity of States is therefore applicable irrespectively of the forum
where the suit is filed.96
85. See Martin H. Redish & Daniel M. Greenfield, Bankruptcy, Sovereign Immunity
and the Dilemma of PrincipledDecision Making: The Curious Case of Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 13 (2007) (opining that the
historical arguments advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court are not convincing enough to
distinguish the bankruptcy clause from the commerce clause).
86. See Randolph J. Haines, FederalismPrinciples in Bankruptcy after Katz, 15 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 135 (2007).

87. See Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77
AM. BANKR. L. J.129 (2003).
88. Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
89. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
90. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627
(1999).
91. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
92. Id. at 378.
93. Alden, 527 U.S. at 706 (1999).
94. Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
95. Alden, 527 U.S. at 749.
96. The U.S. Supreme Court thus rejected that sovereign immunity was a foreign
allocation device. See Vicky C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment,
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In short, the principle of sovereign immunity of states is a
constitutional principle which denies state liability to private claims.
States are only liable for infringing federal law when they have
unequivocally consented to suit or where federal legislation is passed
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Bankruptcy Clause.
C.

Why Has the U.S. Supreme Court Endorsed States' Immunity?

The reasons leading the U.S. Supreme Court to consider state
immunity as one of the key principles in the American constitutional
design are twofold. First, according to the U.S. Supreme Court, an
analysis of the framer's intent leads to the endorsement of sovereign
immunity of states.97 Second, in Alden v. Maine,9 8 the U.S. Supreme
Court added four substantive arguments demonstrating that its
interpretation is consistent with the essential principles of federalism laid
down by the U.S. Constitution.99 Since historical evidence does not
appear to be entirely conclusive, 10 0 it is best to focus on these substantive
arguments.
The first substantive reason announced by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Alden is that, since the United States enjoys immunity from suit both
in federal and state courts, states should be entitled to the same
privilege. 01 In terms of sovereign immunity, there is a constitutional
parity between the two levels of governance 10 2 In this regard, it appears
that this legal parallelism is justified, provided that two conditions are
met: (1) that federal and state immunity have the same constitutional
sources and (2) that they produce the same constitutional effects.
Nevertheless, neither of the two conditions is fulfilled.
First of all, the U.S. Supreme Court itself has recognised that the
sources of federal and state immunity differ. In Lapides v. Board of
and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1988) (supporting the above-stated
theory). But see Ann Woolhandler, Old Property, New Property, and Sovereign
Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 919 (2000) (favouring the repudiation of the abovestated theory).
97. The U.S. Supreme Court has based its historical interpretation on four pieces of
evidence, namely (1) the principle of sovereign immunity as understood at the time of the
American Revolution, (2) Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, (3) the opinion
of the Hans v. Louisiana Court, and (4) States' indebtness during the constitutional
ratification. See Hans v. La., 134 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1890); Alden, 527 U.S. at 715-16.
98. Alden, 527 U.S. at 706.
99. See generally id.
100. For a critical view on historical arguments, see John V. Orth, History and the
Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1147 (2000).
101. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-13. In Cohens v. Va., for the first time the U.S. Supreme
Court clearly recognized that the states were immune to suit. See Cohens v. Va., 19 U.S.
264,411-12(1821).
102. Id.
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Regents 10 3 Georgia, which had waived its immunity before its own
courts, decided to remove the case to the U.S. District Court in order to
invoke its sovereign immunity.' °4 Georgia relied on an analogical
application of the U.S. Supreme Court's case law on cross-claims against
the United States whereby, even if the United States files a suit against a
private party, it does not follow that it is subjected to the full jurisdiction
of the federal judiciary.10 5 Consequently, a private party can only
counter-claim in so far as Congress has agreed. 0 6 However, by recalling
its previous case-law'0 7 the U.S. Supreme Court held that a voluntary
appearance in federal court amounts to a waiver of state immunity.108 To
this effect, the U.S. Supreme Court drew a distinction between state and
federal immunity. It held that cases where the United States is a plaintiff
"do not involve the Eleventh Amendment-a specific text with a history
that focuses upon the State's sovereignty vis-A-vis the Federal
Government."' 1 9 In light of Lapides, it appears that federal immunity
and state immunity are not "two sides of the same coin." State immunity
arises as a limit to federal power, whereas federal immunity is not
explained as a limit to states' powers, but is explained within a wider
constitutional context.
Furthermore, although it is not expressly
mentioned in the wording of the Constitution, Article I Sections 8 and 9,
as well as Article III Section 1, not only create a solid basis in favour of
federal immunity, but they also enshrine two special characteristics
which highlight the differences between federal and state immunity.10°
First, Article I Sections 8 and 9 state that the control of appropriation and
the power to pay debts of the United States is allocated to Congress."'
Therefore, Congress must enact a statute authorising awards of monetary
relief against the federal treasury before judicial relief can be granted.
Second, according to Articles I and III of the U.S. Constitution, Congress
has substantial discretion over the jurisdiction of federal courts and thus,
it could simply shape the federal jurisdiction so as to refuse suits against

103. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002).
104. Id.at 617.
105. Id. at 616-17.
106. See U.S. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940); U.S. v. Shaw, 309 U.S.
495 (1940); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band, Potawatomi Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S.
505 (1991).
107. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 620-22 (quoting Gunter v. AtI. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200
U.S. 273 (1906); Gardner v. N.J., 329 U.S. 565 (1947); and Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S.
436 (1883)). These cases held that the invocation of federal jurisdiction by states cannot
lead to inconsistency and unfairness. See cases cited supra.
108. Lapides, 535 U.S. at 624.
109. Id.at 623.
110. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8-9, art. III, § 1.
111.

Id. art. I, §§ 8-9.
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the federal government.1 1 2 Hence, it seems that, although the United
States can bring proceedings against states in federal courts (because
their consent is deemed given in the Constitution'.3), states cannot bring
a suit against the United States unless Congress has previously agreed to
grant jurisdiction to the federal judiciary and to authorise money relief
against the federal treasury.' 14
Finally, vis-A-vis private individuals, state and federal immunity
have taken different paths. On the one hand, in the absence of a waiver,
the U.S. Supreme Court has relied on suits against states' officials as a
way to compensate for state immunity." 5 On the other hand, by enacting
the Federal Torts Claims Act" 16 (FTCA), Congress has decided that suits
against the United States as such are the normal way to claim liability
against the federal 17government and thus, claims against federal officials
are almost barred."
Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state liability could
threaten the financial integrity of the state and adversely affect its proper
functioning by weakening states' decision-making power with the
possibility of being sued." 8 However, one could counter-argue that
States could enact statutes which would lay down a limited liability. A
limited liability statute would provide a balance between federal rights of
private individuals and state legislative autonomy. In the same way,
although the threat to state financial integrity might justify cases where
states act while relying on their imperium to attain general interests, it is
not an acceptable justification when they carry out commercial activities
in competitive markets. Indeed, in cases such as Florida Prepaid,l l9

112. Id. art. I, §§ 8-9, art. III, § 1; Vicki C. Jackson, Suing the Federal Government:
Sovereignty, Immunity, and Judicial Independence, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 546
(2003).
113. U.S. v. Tex., 143 U.S. 621, 641 (1891); see also Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 709, 755
(1999) (referring to Principality of Monaco v. Miss., 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934)).
114. Kan. v. U.S., 204 U.S. 331, 342 (1907).
115. Carlos M. Vzquez, Eleventh Amendment Schizophrenia, 75 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 859 (2000).
116. See Jackson, supra note 112, at 563-67; see also Helene M. Goldberg, Tort
Liabilityfor Federal Government Actions in the United States: An Overview, in 521 TORT
LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Duncan Fairgrieve et
al. eds., 2002).
117. Jackson, supra note 112, at 565-67. Although it is true that under Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Narcotic Agency, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), suits
against federal officials for constitutional violations are permitted, the U.S. Supreme
Court currently interprets Bivens narrowly and is reluctant to expand suits against federal
officials to other scenarios. See Scweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1994); Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994).
118. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 709, 750 (1999).
119. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
627 (1999).

2009]

COMPARING SUPREMACY

when states are competing on an equal footing with private undertakings
it is difficult to see how their financial integrity is affected while
pursuing an economic activity intended to increase the state treasuries.
Lastly, the U.S. Supreme Court held that state liability not only
would blur federal-state accountability, but it would also be contrary to
the principle of separation of powers.' 20 The U.S. Supreme Court
believes that if, as a result of breaching federal law, Congress could
create remedies which allow monetary relief from state treasuries, states
would be forced to align their policies with federal mandates and
consequently, the states would not be able to comply with their
electorate's wishes.'12 It follows that not only would states' political
independence be undermined, but it would also be impossible to identify
which government is actually responsible for the positive or negative
impact of such policies. Accordingly, political accountability would be
blurred. In the same way, the U.S. Supreme Court considers that it is for
the state legislature and not for the federal or state judiciary to determine
how state resources should be spent.' 22 In fact, empowering courts with
the possibility of awarding damages would transform the judiciary into a
decision-making institution on budgetary matters and, thus, would
violate the principle of separation of powers.
As a result, the U.S. Supreme Court believes that actions for
damages against states have both vertical and horizontal repercussions
which are incompatible with the U.S. Constitution.123 However, even if
these substantive reasons are well founded, it seems that they do not
safeguard the supremacy of federal law. The U.S. Supreme Court's reply
to this objection is that the Constitution provides alternative remedies
which render suits for damages against the states unnecessary.
D. Alternative Remedies
In addition to the aforementioned substantive reasons, the U.S.
Supreme Court has held that state liability is not a necessary instrument
to secure the supremacy of federal law. In the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion, the Constitution has provided alternative remedies which
sufficiently secure states' compliance with federal law, while respecting
state immunity. Therefore, it appears that the U.S. Supreme Court is
proud of having found a balance between states' sovereignty and the
supremacy of federal law. These alternative remedies are, on one hand,

120.
121.
122.
123.

Alden, 527 U.S. at 751 (1999).
Id.at750-51.
Id. at 752.
Id.at 751.
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suits brought by the federal government and, on the other, suits for
prospective and retrospective relief against state officials.
1.

United States as a Plaintiff

States may not rely on their immunity against actions for
prospective relief to recover a fine or to claim damages brought by the
federal government. The federal government does not have to prove any
interest in the case. The basis of its claim may be the enforcement of a
federal statute.1 24 The U.S. Supreme Court only requires that the federal
government retains full discretion to start, suspend or put an end to
proceedings against infringing states and consequently, private
individuals whose rights have been infringed cannot compel the federal
government to act in their defence. Nor can the federal government
delegate to private individuals its privilege applicant status. The reason
is that the U.S. Supreme Court draws a distinction between private suits
and suits brought by the United States, which is "entrusted with the
constitutional duty to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. ,,125
Indeed, in its opinion, unlike suits brought by private individuals, "suits
brought by the United States itself require the exercise of political
responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State.' 26
However, two objections can be raised against the suitability of this
remedy. First, while the federal government would most certainly start
proceedings against states whose breach of federal law adversely affects
the population at large, it is doubtful that it would do the same in cases

124. This is not the case for the United States. In the light of New Hampshire v.
Louisiana, a state cannot enforce a private right against another State. 108 U.S. at 91
(1883).
125. U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3.
126. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756. Further, the distinction between private and public
enforcement has also been drawn by the ECJ. Suits brought by the United States seem to
play a similar constitutional function to enforcement actions brought by the commission
against a member state under ex Article 226 EC (now Article 258 TFEU). In this regard,
the ECJ has ruled that it is not the exercise of a private interest that underpins actions
brought under ex Article 226 EC (now Article 258 TFEU), but the exercise of political
responsibility. See Case C-445/06, Danske Slagterier v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland,
43-44, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:
62006J0445:EN:HTML. The ECJ has not, however, invoked ex Article 226 EC (now
Article 258 TFEU) to reject claims in damages brought by private parties. Ever since
Van Gend en Loos was delivered, the ECJ has embraced the theory of "dual vigilance,"
whereby public and private means of judicially enforcing EU law are not seen in
competition, but in cooperation. See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Neth. Inland
Revenue Admin., 1963 E.C.R. 1 ("The vigilance of individuals concerned to protect their
rights amount to an effective supervision in addition to the supervision entrusted by
articles 168 and 170 [presently, 226 and 227] to the diligence of the Commission and of
the Member States.").
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where violations only affect a few private individuals. 27 Second, the
federal government might not be interested in filing a suit against an
infringing state because it might have adverse repercussions in the
political arena. 128 This means that political responsibility is a concept not
necessarily related to states' compliance with federal law. Thus, the aim
of this remedy is not as much to protect the rights of individuals as to
protect the interests of the federal government. As long as there is an
overlap between the two interests, judicial protection of private rights is
ensured. Nonetheless, if there is a conflict of interests, political
responsibility might prevail over effectiveness of federal rights.
From private individuals' standpoint, suits for prospective or
retrospective relief against state officials appear to be the only available
way to enforce the individuals' federal rights.
2.

Suits for Prospective Relief: Ex parte Young

Federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate in cases where private
individuals or entities seek injunctions against state officials for breach
federal law. In Ex parte Young, 129 the attorney general of Minnesota
sought to rely on the Eleventh Amendment to avoid complying with a
circuit court order, or that declared Minnesota's railroad rates scheme
unconstitutional and thus, ordered its elimination. However, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the circuit court mandamus.' 30 It ruled that
unconstitutional acts cannot be attributed to the states, and consequently,
whenever a state official violates federal law, he is "stripped of his
official or representative character and is subjected to the consequences
of his individuals conduct." 13' Thus, although sovereign immunity
prevents individuals from suing states, the so-called Ex parte Young
32
doctrine allows them to seek an injunction against their state officials.'
However, because states can only act through their officials, a suit
for prospective relief against the officials is indeed a suit for prospective
relief against the states. As a result, because the distinction between the
addressees of the injunction is purely formalistic, the U.S. Supreme

127. Vizquez, supra note 115, at 871.
128. See Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1011, 1022 (noting that "Congress may reasonably
doubt that federal governmental resources are wisely used to pursue litigation against
state agencies when a private right-holder's interest is great but the public interest may be
small.").
129. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
130. Id. at 148.
131. Id. at 160.
132. Id.
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Court has finally recognised that Ex parte33Young doctrine is in fact a
derogation from the Eleventh Amendment. 1
In order to rely on this remedy, the application must fulfil two
conditions: first, there must be an alleged violation of federal law;
second, the application must address an ongoing violation, that is,
applicants cannot seek compensation or retrospective relief for past
violations. The prospective-retrospective distinction was drawn by the
U.S. Supreme Court in Edelman v. Jordan.'34 In that case, the applicant
brought a class action against a state official seeking to recover the
money that Illinois had withheld in breach of a federal statute.' 35 The
U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the application, holding that the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits 36
seeking retrospective monetary relief to be paid
1
treasury.
state
the
from
Following the same trend as it did in relation to congressional
powers under Article I and under the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S.
Supreme Court has also narrowed down the Ex parte Young doctrine in
favour of states' sovereign interests. 37 In this sense, in Seminole Tribe
the applicant based its application on two claims. 38 The first was against
the state of Florida, claiming that it had breached the IRGA. 39 In the
second claim, the applicant sought prospective relief against Florida's
governor, who, in spite of being obliged by this federal statute to enter
into a compact with the Seminole Tribe, did not do so.' 40 As mentioned
above, the U.S. Supreme Court declared the IRGA unconstitutional on
the ground that Congress lacked power under Article I of the U.S.
Constitution to abrogate states' immunity.' 4' As for the second plea, the
U.S. Supreme Court refused to apply the Ex parte Young doctrine,
holding that, since the IRGA provided for suits against the states, it also
implicitly pre-empted suits against state officials. As a result, the
application was dismissed in its entirety.
In the same way, in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene, 142 the U.S. Supreme
Court dealt with an entitlement dispute between Idaho officials and the
Coeur d'Alene Tribe over the submerged lands and bed of Lake Coeur

133. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Haldermann, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984).
134. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
135. Id. at 653.
136. For the difficulties in applying the prospective-retrospective distinction, see infra
pt. II(B).
137. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 47.
142. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261 (1996).
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d'Alene. 143 The Tribe filed an Ex parte Young injunction aiming at
prohibiting state officials from taking any further regulatory action in
violation of its federal rights to the lands. 144 However, the U.S. Supreme
Court refused to grant an injunction.145 Writing for the Court, Justice
Kennedy stated that where special sovereignty interests of states are at
stake or where prospective relief becomes as intrusive as an award of
46
damages against the state, Ex parte Young is not applicable.
Otherwise, the principle of
state sovereign immunity would be reduced
147
to "an empty formalism.'
In Seminole Tribe, the limitation imposed on the Ex parte Young
doctrine was not so significant in so far as it only shifted the burden of
proof to Congress, which is now required to expressly mention that
federal action against a state does not prevent private individuals from
relying on prospective relief against state officials. 148 By contrast, Coeur
d'Alene is an important curtail to prospective relief. There, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the exercise of federal jurisdiction is not
conditioned upon protecting federal law alone, but it must also take into
account state sovereign interests. 149 In other words, this remedy which,
in the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion, would secure the supremacy of
federal law is also submitted to the Eleventh Amendment. In so far as
suits for prospective relief do not adversely affect the states' most
valuable interests, this remedy would be available to private individuals
and entities. Nevertheless, even if federal law has been manifestly
breached by a state official, the latter would be protected by the Eleventh
Amendment if Ex parte Young would turn out to be too intrusive.
However, as the dissenting Justices pointed out in Coeur d'Alene, it
is difficult to distinguish this case from others where federal rights have
been granted to private individuals. 50 It seems that an injunction against
an economic regulatory activity (as was the case in Ex parte Young) is as
intrusive as an injunction against the regulation of the use of land.
Besides, Ex parte Young is per se "intrusive" since state officials are
almost always doing what their state's legislative and administrative
authorities intend for them to do.' 5' Thus, this evisceration of Ex parte
Young deprives individuals from effective prospective relief, not only
because the U.S. Supreme Court did not specify what "special sovereign
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 264.
Id.
Id. at 287.
Id. at 270.
Coeurd'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 270.
Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 77 (1996).
Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. at 267-68.
Id. at311.
Id. at 312.
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interests" means, but also because the Court seems to justify state
officials' impunity for unlawful breaches of valid federal law, leading to
a clear infringement of the principle of supremacy of federal law, and
most importantly, of the rule of law. However, in defence of the U.S.
Supreme Court's reasoning, one could object that, since Idaho had
waived its sovereign immunity in its own courts, the Coeur d'Alene
Tribe's federal rights could still be protected. The Coeur d'Alene Tribe
52
could consequently rely on state courts to apply federal law.'
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court is eager to reinforce the principle of
subsidiary as it did in Florida Prepaid before granting federal courts
with jurisdiction. Granting such jurisdiction would undermine states'
immunity, and 53
accordingly, the remedies available in state court need to
be considered.1
3.

Suits for Retrospective Relief: State Official's Liability

Furthermore, prospective relief in and of itself is not sufficient to
ensure that state officials will comply with federal law. As a matter of
fact, this remedy is only suitable to put an end to current or prospective
violations of federal law. It is not, however, an appropriate means to
render states liable for prior infringements. If the Constitution only
allowed individuals to seek prospective relief, there would be many,
albeit temporary, violations of federal law. Thus, in order to secure the
supremacy of federal law, its violations not only have to be stopped, but
also deterred. In the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion, suits claiming
damages against state officials acting in their individual capacity are the
deterrent element
by which violations of federal law would be
54
1
prevented.
A state official's liability for breach of constitutional and federal
rights is laid down in the Civil Rights Act of 1871155 and in the U.S.
152. Id.at 274-276.
153. See Carlos M. Vdzquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and the
Unravelling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment
Doctrine, 87 GEO. L. J. 1, 42-51 (1999) (noting that this part of the Opinion did not enjoy
the support of the majority).
154. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 709, 756 (1999).
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996) reads as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that
in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in
such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
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Supreme Court case-law. Private individuals can start proceedings either
before federal or state courts. In the latter case, since the claim for
damages is based on federal law,
state statutes limiting the liability of
56
state officials are inapplicable. 1
Moreover, pursuant to the U.S. Supreme Court, this remedy is
First, state officials enjoy "qualified
subject to two limitations.
immunity,"' 157 which "reflects an attempt to balance competing values:
not only the importance of a damages remedy to protect the rights of
citizen, [but also] the need to protect officials who are required to
exercise their discretion and the related public interest in encouraging the
vigorous exercise of official authority."' 58 Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court
has set up a threshold of liability, which deters state officials from
breaching federal law, while ensuring that they will carry out their tasks
with normality. This means that ensuring the supremacy of federal law
must not simultaneously entail that valid state law is not applied by
fearful state officials.
In this sense, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that state officials are
liable for breach of federal law in so far as the law violated was "clearly
established."'' 59 The U.S. Supreme Court applies a test "that focuses on
the objective legal reasonableness of an official's acts,"' 60 and thus, the
official's subjective good faith is irrelevant.' 6' Where the state official is
expected to know that his conduct was in breach of statutory or
constitutional rights, then injured parties can bring an action for damages
against the state official. As a result, a mere breach of federal law is not
sufficient to render the state official liable, it is just necessary that "a

declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the
purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of

Columbia.
156. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); see also Fred L. Morrison, The
Liability of Governmentsfor Legislative Acts in the United States of America, 46 AM. J.
COMp. L. 531 (1998).
157. Nevertheless, judges, prosecutors, and legislators are entitled to "absolute
immunity." See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 232 (1978) (judges); Butz v. Economou,
438 U.S. 478 (1978) (prosecutors); Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491
(1975) (legislators). Compare with Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du
Ncheur SA v. F.R.G., The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd.,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1029; and Case C-224/01, K6bler v. Republik Osterreich, 2003 E.C.R. I10239.
158. Butz, 438 U.S. at 504-06.
159. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 801 (1982).
160. Id. at 818.
161. See John C. Jeffries Jr., In Praiseof the Eleventh Amendment and Section 1983,
84 VA. L. REv. 47 (1998) (In accordance with Jeffries, some constitutional violations
require more than "negligence," they require a particular intention or purpose, e.g., racial
discrimination.).
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reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that
1 62
right.
Second, state officials can only be sued in their individual capacity,
that is, applications must seek compensation from the state official's
personal resources, not from the state treasury. The case of Edelman v.
Jordan163 illustrates this point. In this case, respondent John Jordan filed
a complaint seeking relief against two former directors of the Illinois
Department of Public Aid, alleging that these officials were
administering federal aid in a manner inconsistent with federal
regulations and the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution.64
However, his application was limited to recovering the money that was
wrongfully withheld. 65 Had Jordan's application been upheld, the
money would not have come from the state official's pocket, but from
Illinois' treasury. 66 Said differently, Edelman's claim was not an action
in tort against the state official but in restitution against the state of
Illinois. Likewise, as the principle of agency states, "a servant is liable
for torts committed in the master's business, [but] the servant is not
responsible for master's contract."' 167 Hence, it seems that the U.S.
Supreme Court distinguishes between actions in torts and actions in
contract. Tort claims are admissible under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
whereas
68
1
Amendment.
Eleventh
the
by
barred
are
claims
contract
the
However, the difference between obtaining compensation from the
state official's own resources and from the state treasury is blurred by a
widespread system of indemnification, pursuant to which damage
judgments rendered against state officials are usually, directly or
indirectly, paid by the state. 69 As Professor Vdizquez points out,
162.
163.
164.

Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Id. at 653.

165. Id.
166. Id. at 663.
167. Jeffries Jr., supra note 161, at 66.
168. Id. at 67-68.
169. The attempt to equate official liability accompanied by compensation with state
liability has been criticised by some scholars. For instance, Meltzer put forwards four
arguments against this straightforward assumption: First, Congress would have to
modify a range of status in order for injured parties to direct action in damages against
state officials; Second, it is often difficult to determine which official is to be held
responsible; Third, indemnification is neither universal, nor may it cover all type of
wrongdoing; Finally, states might limit their coverage to the loss actually suffered by the
state official as a result of an adverse judgment. See Meltzer, supra note 128, at 1018-21.
But see, Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, MunicipalLiability Under§ 1983: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 249 (positing that state and personal liability are
economically undistinguishable in so far as two conditions are fulfilled, namely "(1) the
employee has sufficient assets to pay any conceivable judgment in full (perhaps with the
aid of an insurance or contractual indemnification from the employer) (2) the transaction
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prospective state officials will consider the risk of being sued for
violation of federal law before accepting to work for the state. 170 Thus,
the state will have to either pay the judgment directly, indemnify the
official or get a less competent employee.1 71 Accordingly, the economic
risk for an eventual breach of federal law is not supported, at least in its
entirety, by the state official, but is a burden on the state treasury. It
follows that, because since state officials do not suffer the economic
consequences of their wrongdoing, through the system of
indemnification
states are "dampening the incentive to comply with
172
federal law."
Nevertheless, one could raise four arguments in favour of the
deterring effect of this remedy. 173 First, one could argue that states are
not legally obliged to indemnify their officials. Second, states have the
option of setting a maximum for indemnification. Third, states could
refuse to indemnify in cases where the official engaged in gross
negligence or wilful misconduct. Finally, if an official is called to court,
he or she would suffer the embarrassment of having been found
responsible for violating federal law. However, these arguments do not
appear to be entirely convincing. Although states are not legally
compelled to indemnify state officials, states are economically compelled
to do so. As previously mentioned, actions for damages against state
officials transfer the economic risk for violations of federal law to states,
and consequently,
states will directly or indirectly have to suffer that
174
burden.
Moreover, denying indemnification in cases of gross negligence or
wilful misconduct would push the threshold of deterrence to a higher
level than the one applied by the U.S. Supreme Court in the "clearly
established" test. In the same way, the level of deterrence will not be
established in accordance with the case-law of the U.S. Supreme Court,
but by states' discretion. As for capping indemnification, the deterrent
effect would depend on the amount that the state has agreed to cover.
The lower it is, the more deterring it will be. However, by fixing a
maximum indemnification, states take into account not only the level of
deterrence to ensure an appropriate compliance with federal law, but also
other policy considerations, such as the necessary amount to attract
costs of employment contracts that include terms to allocate liability between the
employer and the employee are small.").
170. V6izquez, supra note 115, at 880-88.
171. Id.at880.
172. Id. at 883.
173. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment?
The Limited Impact of the Court'sSovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 213,
261 (2006).
174. Jeffries Jr., supra note 161, at 62; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8, at 1823.
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competent employees or how much resources the states want to spend to
cover officials' liability in detriment to other expenses. In other words,
by fixing a maximum indemnification, the degree of compliance with
federal law would depend on a series of economic factors, all of which
would depend on each state's budgetary policy. Finally, although it is
true that a state official who is found responsible for violations of federal
or constitutional law will have to suffer the embarrassment of his
behaviour, it does not appear sufficient to produce a deterrent effect and
consequently, to reinforce the supremacy of federal law, in the hands of
the moral values of the state officials.
Consequently, as it currently stands, since states assume the
economic risks for violations of federal law committed by state officials,
suits for damages against the latter do not provide a sufficient degree of
deterrence to ensure the supremacy of federal law.
II.

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE LIABILITY UNDER

A.

Concept

EU LAW

The principle of state liability under EU law implies that where a
member state 75 has seriously breached community rights, individuals are
entitled to reparation for the damages suffered as a result of the state's
breach. It is thus a retrospective remedy, which has a financial nature.
State liability can also be seen as an economic sanction against infringing
member states; it is for these states to assume the economic
repercussions of their wrongdoing, and not for the injured parties. It
follows that like most judicial remedies in a federal system, state liability
has a double dimension: it renders effective individual federal rights,
176
while it keeps national governments under the rule of federal law.
The European Court of Justice has consistently ruled that in spite of
being enforced by national courts, the principle of state liability must be
determined by referring to the conditions laid down by the ECJ in
Francovich177 and Brasserie.178
State liability is therefore an
independent concept, which does not have to take into account additional
requirements of tort law.

175. "State" in this section refers to member states within in the EU.
176. See generally, Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8.
177. See Joined Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R.
1-5357.
178. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. F.R.G., The
Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 34.
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Moreover, the ECJ does not distinguish among the branches of the
state liable for having violated community law. 179 On the contrary, it
considers that it is the member state as a whole that has committed the
infringement. 180 Accordingly, the same conditions of liability apply
irrespective of whether the violation has been committed by the regional
8' the legislature,' 82 the
or central 1government,'
judiciary 183 or public
84
authorities.'
Furthermore, the principle of state liability has been influenced by
and, subsequently, has influenced the principle of non-contractual
liability of the community institutions. At first, the ECJ inferred from ex
Article 288 EC (now Article 340 TFEU), 85 which embodies the
principle of non-contractual liability of the European Union, that there is
a general principle of liability of public authorities, familiar to the legal
86
systems of the member states and recognised by the EU legal order.'
Thus, not only EU institutions, but also member states are liable for
breaches of EU law. Later, in Bergadem,187 in order to determine
whether the European Commission was liable for breach of EU law, the
ECJ applied the conditions laid down by its case-law on state liability. 88
Thus, there has been a mutual influence or crossed-fertilization 89
between the two principles, which submits member states and the
European Union to the same standard of liability.
In addition, the principle of state liability has also influenced
national administrative law. 190 Indeed, nowadays the conditions of
179. See Roy W. Davis, Liability in Damagesfor a Breach of Community Law: Some
Reflections on Who to Sue and the Concept of State, 31 EUR. L. REV. 69 (2006); Georgios
Anagnostaras, The Allocation of Responsibility in State Liability Actions for Breach of
Community Law: A Modern Gordian Knot?, 26 EUR. L. REV. 139, 152-53 (2001).
180. Brasserie,1996 E.C.R. 34.
181. Case C-302/97, Konle v. Republik Osterreich, 1999 E.C.R. 1-3099, 62.
182. Brasserie,1996 E.C.R. 35.
183. See Case C-224/01, K6bler v. Republik Osterreich, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10239.
184. Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahniirztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, 2000
E.C.R. 1-5123; See also Case C-118/00, Larsy v. INASTI, 2001 E.C.R. 1-5063.
185. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union, art. 340, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 193, reads as follows:
In the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any
damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their
duties.
186. Brasserie, 1996 E.C.R. 29.
187. Case C-352/98 P, Laboratoires Pharmaceutiques Bergadem SA v. Comm'n of
the Eur. Cmty., 2000 E.C.R. 1-5291.
188. Id. 34-35.
189. PANAGIOTIS TAKis TRIDIMAS, TIlE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF EC LAw 475 (Oxford,
2006).
190. Marie-Pierre F. Granger, National Applications of Francovich and the
Construction of a EuropeanAdministrative ius commune, 32 EUR. L. REV. 157 (2007).
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liability of public authorities for breach of national law are often
influenced by the ones laid down by the ECJ for breach of EU law. 191
Hence, there has been a spill-over effect which is leading, in the words of
Van Gerven, to the creation of
a jus commune europeus in terms of the
92
1
authorities.
public
liability of
As a result, the characteristics of the principle of state liability under
EU law are threefold: (1) independence in its definition, (2) uniformity
93
and universality in its application, and (3) a harmonizing aptitude.'
B.

The Breakthrough: Francovich

Until 1991 when Francovich was decided, the ECJ had held that it
was for the national law to decide whether individuals could claim
damages arising from violations of EU law. In Russo v. AIMA,1 94 the
Court's reply to this question was that the state was "liable to the injured
party of the consequences in the context of the provisions of national law
on the liability of the State."' 95 The ECJ's self-restraint can be explained
by its ruling in Rewe v. Hauptzollamt Kiel,196 where it held that "[the
treaty] was not intended to create new remedies."' 197 In other words, the
98
ECJ believed that the principle of procedural autonomy'200
99
counterbalanced by the principles of equivalence' and effectiveness,

191. Id. at 188-89.
192. Walter Van Gerven, The Emergence of a Common European Law in the Area of
Tort Law: The EU Contribution, in TORT LIABILITY OF PUBLIC AUTHORITIES IN
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 125-47 (Duncan Fairgrieve, Mads Andenas & John Bell eds.,
BIIC 2002).
193. Id.
194. Case 60/75, Russo v. ALMA, 1976 E.C.R. 45.
195. Id. 9.
196. Case 158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel, 1981
E.C.R. 1805.
197. Id. 6.
198. As opposed to the United States, there is no dual system of state and federal
courts in the EU. See KOEN LENAERTS, DIRK ARTS & IGNACE MASELIS, PROCEDURAL
LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 83 (Maxwell Sweet, 2006). The enforcement of EU rights
is decentralised. Id. It is entrusted to national courts who act as "juges de l'Union." See
TRIDIMAS, supra note 189, at 419. This means that it is for EU law to provide the
substantive right, and for national law to provide the remedy. Id. This division of tasks
between rights and remedies is known as the principle of national procedural autonomy.
Id. Nonetheless, if the judicial protection of EU rights were left at the absolute mercy of
the member states, its effectiveness would be seriously undermined. The principles of
primacy and direct effect would be reduced to mere postulates. Id. at 418. That is why the
ECJ has consistently held that the principle of national procedural autonomy is not
absolute, but subject to the dual and complementary limitation of the principles of
equivalence and effectiveness. Id. at 423.
199. The principle of equivalence is nothing more than the application of the principle
of equal treatment to the law of remedies. Unless there is an objective and proportionate
justification, member states may not deny remedies to rights based on EU law, if the
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provided an adequate level of judicial protection to EU rights, and,
consequently, additional remedies were not required.2 °'
By embracing the principle of state liability for breach of EU law,
the ECJ brought the missing piece in its vision of EU remedies. Thus,
along with Simmenthal,20 2 Johnston,20 3 and Factortame ,20 4 Francovich
can be considered as one of the landmark cases of the ECJ in providing
national courts with judicial instruments aiming at enforcing the
effectiveness of EU Law.2 °5 Due to its unquestionable importance, this
case is discussed in detail in this article.
The facts of Francovich20 6 can be summarised as follows. Italy had
failed to implement Directive 80/987/EEC 7 which compelled member
states to provide specific guarantees of payment of unpaid wage claims.
Mr. Francovich and Ms. Bonifaci 20 8 brought proceedings against their
former employers seeking payment of their wages. 20 9 However, as a
result of their employer's insolvency and since under Italian law there
were no guarantees to cover their unpaid wages, the applicants brought
proceedings against Italy seeking compensation.1 °
In a preliminary reference procedure, two Italian courts asked the
ECJ two questions. First, could the plaintiffs rely on the directive to
oblige Italy to pay the guarantee laid down therein? 211 Second, if the

same remedies are available to rights having a similar purpose and cause of action but
based on national law. See Case C-326/96 Levez v. T.H. Jennings Ltd., 1998 E.C.R. I835; Case C-78/98, Preston v. Wolverhampton Healthcare NHS Trust, 2000 E.C.R. I3201. For a more recent example, see Case C-268/06 Impact v. Minister for Agric. &
Food, 2008 E.C.R. 1-2483. In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has also ruled
that a State may not discriminate against federal cause of actions unless there is a valid
excuse. See Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
200. See infra Part II(C)(1).
201. See Case 33/76, Rewe-Zentralfinaz eG v. Landwirtschaftskammer ftir das
Saarland, 1976 E.C.R. 1989; Case 45/76, Comet BV v. Produktschap voor Siergewassen,
1976 E.C.R. 2043.
202. Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finaze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
1978 E.C.R. 629 (holding that EU rights have to be fully effective).
203. Case C-222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
1986 E.C.R. 1651 (ruling that the judicial protection of EU rights is a general principle of
EU law).
204. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame
Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433 (requiring national courts to grant interim relief, even if it was
impossible under national law).

205.

TRIDIMAS,

supra note 189, ch. 11.

206. Cases C-6/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
207. Council Directive 80/987, 1980 O.J. (L 283) 23-27 (EC).
208. The proceedings were brought by Ms. Bonifaci and 33 other employees. See
Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 5.
209. Id.
210. Id. 6.
211. Id. 7.
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previous question were answered in the negative, they asked whether the
plaintiff could claim damages against the infringing member state.21 2
First, the ECJ found that the provisions of the directive concerning
the identity of the beneficiaries and the scope of the rights were
213
unconditional and sufficiently precise to give rise to direct effect.
However, this was not the case regarding the person liable.21 4 Indeed, in
accordance with the directive, the member states had two possibilities
when choosing the methods of financing the guarantee institution: 21it
5
could either be financed by the employers or by public authorities.
Hence, since the member states enjoyed some discretion in the
implementing process, the provisions of the directive were not
sufficiently unconditional and precise to give rise to directly enforceable
rights.216
Second, as for claiming damages, the ECJ answered in the
affirmative.2 17 The ECJ held that the EC Treaty (now replaced by the
FEU Treaty) has created its own legal system, whose subjects are not
only the member states, but also their nationals.1 i It added that EU law
can impose obligations and grant rights to individuals, which are to be
found not only in the wording of the EC Treaty (now replaced by the
FEU Treaty), but also by virtue of the obligations clearly imposed on the
member states, EU institutions or other individuals.219 In this sense, it is
for the national courts to give full effect to EU law and to protect these
rights. Then, the Court went on to rule that:
The full effectiveness of [EU] rules would be impaired and the
protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if
individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are
infringed by a breach of [EU] law for which a Member State can be
held responsible.
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is
particularly indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectiveness
of [EU] rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and
where, consequently, in the absence of such action, individuals
cannot enforce before the national courts the rights conferred upon
them by [EU] law.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

Id.
Francovich, 1991 E.C.R.
Id. 9T25-26.
Id. 23.
Id. 99 17, 25.
Id. T 35.
Francovich, 1991 E.C.R.
Id.

14.

31.
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It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss
and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of [EU] law
for which the22State
can be held responsible is inherent in the system
0
of the Treaty.
Additionally, the ECJ stressed that ex Article 10 EC (now Article
4(3) TEU) 22 1 can be considered as a further basis for state liability.2 22 It
argued that the principle of loyal cooperation, enshrined in ex Article 10
EC (now Article 4(3) TEU), obliges member states not only to take "all
appropriate measures ...to ensure the fulfilment of their obligations
under EU law," but also to "nullify the unlawful consequences of a
223
breach of EU law.,
The ECJ announced the three conditions which must be fulfilled in
order to render a member state liable for violating EU law. 224 First, the
implementation of the directive should result in granting rights to
individuals. 5 Second, the directive itself should suffice to identify the
content of those rights.22 6 Finally, there must be a casual link between
the breach of the infringing member state and loss or damage suffered by
the individual.227
Even though in a preliminary reference procedure, the ECJ is not
supposed to rule on the case at issue. Rather, the ECJ leaves with the
national court to decide in the light of its ruling. However, in this case,
the ECJ went all the way, and provided the Italian courts with the
outcome. It held that, since the aforementioned conditions were fulfilled,
the referring courts should uphold the rights of Mr. Francovich and Ms.
Bonifaci in obtaining compensation from Italy for the loss or damage
suffered as a result of the non-implementation of Directive 80/987.228
220. Id. 1 33.
221. Article 4(3) in the Treaty on European Union, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 18, provides:
Pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, the Union and the Member
States shall, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out tasks which
flow from the Treaties.
The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to
ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaties or resulting from
the acts of the institutions of the Union.
The Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the Union's tasks and
refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union's
objectives.
222.

Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 121.

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. T 36.
Id. 11 38-43.
Id.
Id.
Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. IT 38-43.
Id. 144.
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C. Legal Basis
In Francovich, the ECJ's rationale was based on two principles,
namely, the principle of effectiveness and the principle of cooperation.
1.

Principle of Effectiveness

The principle of effectiveness can be defined as the teleological
interpretation of the constitutional principles of primacy and direct
effect,229 that is to say, the transformation of "programmatic principles"
into "judicial instruments."
Because the enforcement of EU law is decentralised, national courts
play a fundamental role in ensuring that EU rights are respected. Indeed,
it is difficult to imagine how EU law would prevail over national law and
be directly enforceable before national courts, if the latter did not have
Consequently, the more
power to render these postulates real.
empowered national courts are, the more respected primacy and direct
effect will be.23°
Furthermore, in relation to national procedural rules, the principle of
effectiveness can be assessed from a dual contrasting perspective. On
the one hand, it can be seen as a "negative judicial power," that is, by
virtue of the principles of primacy and direct effect, national courts have
the authority to set aside any national procedural rule which undermines
the effectiveness of EU law.23 1 On the other hand, it can also be
considered as a "positive judicial power," which enables national courts
to create new remedies, where the existing national ones are not adequate
to guarantee a sufficient level of protection of EU rights. 32 In addition,
whereas the first aspect only implies purifying national rules of
procedure in light of EU law, the second involves the creation of new
remedies via judicial interpretation. Hence, it is clear that effectiveness
seen as a way to cover remedial gaps is more intrusive than setting aside
national rules of procedure.
In fact, this distinction can be found in the evolving case law of the
ECJ. At first, the ECJ held in Simmentha 2 33 that national courts had the
229. TRIDIMAS, supra note 189, ch. 9.
230. Matej Accetto & Stefan Zleptnig, The Principle of Effectiveness: Rethinking its
Role in Community Law, 11 EUR. PUB. L. 375 (2005); see also Francis Snyder, The
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and
Techniques, 56 MOD. L. REv. 19 (1993).

231. See Case 106/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
SpA, 1970 E.C.R. 1-10239, T 22.
232. See Case C-432/05 Unibet Ltd. v. Justitiekanslem, 2007 E.C.R. 1-227 1, 41 (for
the first time expressly recognising that creating new remedies is possible where
necessary to safeguard EU rights).
233. See Simmenthal, 1970 E.C.R. 22.
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power to set aside any provision, including of constitutional ranking,
which "might impair the effectiveness of EU law. 234 However, at the
same time, the ECJ refused to grant national courts with a "positive
judicial power," that is, creating new remedies was out of the question.23 5
At second stage, the ECJ realised that setting aside national
provisions inconsistent with EU law was not sufficient to ensure a
suitable level of judicial protection, in particular, where there were
remedial lacunas in national law. To this end, in Johnston,23 6 the ECJ
held that a certificate issued by the Secretary of State precluding any
judicial review as to its compatibility with Directive 76/207237 was in
breach of EU law. 238 The ECJ stated that "the right to obtain an effective
remedy in a competent court against measures which they consider to be
contrary to the principle of equal treatment" was a general principle of
EU law and thus, it was for the member states to take all appropriate
measures capable of securing an effective judicial control.239 In other
words, the ECJ urged the member states to create new remedies where
necessary. In the same way, in Factortame L240 the House of Lords
asked the ECJ whether, owing to the fact that under English law the
judiciary was unable to grant interim relief against an act of Parliament,
such power could be derived from EU law. 24 1 The ECJ answered in the
affirmative and consequently, British courts were bestowed with a new
prospective remedy, which ran counter to the ancient principle of
parliamentary supremacy. 242 Thus, the ECJ took a step further: not only
are member states obliged to create effective remedies, but also EU law
in itself can grant national courts with the necessary instrumental power
to ensure an effective judicial protection.
Finally, as Professor Tridimas points out, Francovichcan be seen as
the ultimate step toward the full enforcement of the principles of primacy
and direct effect.243 The facts of the case demonstrate that the applicant
did not have any remedies other than to claim damages against Italy.
Indeed, since the provisions of the non-implemented directive lacked
direct effect, the latter could not be enforced before the national courts.
234. See Case 158/80, Rewe-Handelsgesellschaft Nord mbH v. Hauptzollamt Kiel,
1981 E.C.R. 1805.
235. Id.
236. Case C-222/84, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary,
1986 E.C.R. 1651, T 19.
237. See Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40-42 (EC).
238. Johnston, 1986 E.C.R. 19.
239. Johnston, 1986 E.C.R.
18-19.
240. Case C-213/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame
Ltd., 1990 E.C.R. 1-2433.
241. Id. 91-2.
242. Id. $T 21-23.
243. TRIDIMAS, supra note 189, at 500-01.
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As a result, not only would the plaintiffs be deprived from any remedy,
but also this remedial gap would put into question the binding capacities
of non-implemented directives. Hence, in the light of its previous caselaw, Francovich represents a consistent development. First, by closing a
remedial gap, it enhanced the protection of EU rights. Second, the ECJ
completed the range of remedies arising from EU law. National courts
can grant prospective and also retrospective relief. Finally, by shifting
the economic burden of non-implemented directives, it reinforced their
binding character and thus, their effectiveness.
2.

Principle of Loyal Cooperation:
Article 4(3) TEU)

Ex Article 10 EC (Now

The principle of loyal cooperation imposes two types of obligations
on the member states. On the one hand, they must adopt all the
necessary measures to fulfil their obligations under EU Law, as well as
to facilitate the task of the EU institutions. On the other, they must
refrain from adopting any measure capable of putting at risk the
objectives of the European Union.24 4
Therefore, ex Article 10 EC (now Article 4(3) TEU) has been relied
upon by the ECJ in order to impose additional obligations on the member
states. 245 This treaty provision is a legal basis which favours the
teleological interpretation of EU provisions, that is, their effet utile.246
Although ex Article 10 EC (now Article 4(3) TEU) does not have direct
effect, in conjunction with other treaty provisions, it is a powerful
instrument.2 47 In other words, ex Article 10 EC (now Article 4(3) TEU)
operates as a "catalyst of European integration." It does not produce any
effects in and of itself, but in reaction with other principles, it causes
great change. Indeed, ex Article 10 EC (now Article 4(3) TEU) is not a
substantive provision. It requires cooperation from the member states,
but it does not specify either in which subject-matters or to what extent
member states must cooperate. Consequently, the ECJ has relied on this
provision in a large variety of cases, 248 but always with the same goal in
mind: fostering the enforcement of European law. It follows that it is not

244. See Accetto & Zleptnig, supra note 230, at 386-38.
245. John Temple Lang, The Principle of Loyal Cooperation and the Role of the
NationalJudge in Community, Union and EEA Law, 7 ERA-FORUM 476 (2006).
246. Id. at 477.
247. ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT OF JUSTICE 93 (1999).
248. See generally John Temple Lang, Developments,Issues and New Remedies-The
Duties of National Authorities and Courts Under Article 10 of the EC Treaty, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1904 (2004) (presents an overview of the cases in which this
principle has been applied).
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surprising that the ECJ also relied on ex Article 10 EC (now Article 4(3)
TEU) to enhance the consistency of its ruling in Francovich.
D. Fromfilling in a lacuna to a GeneralPrinciple: Joined Cases
Brasseriedu Pdcheurand FactortameIII
In these cases, 249 Brasserie du Prcheur, a French brewery, sought
compensation from Germany for the loss of earning resulting from
German legislation on Beer purity which, pursuant to a previous
judgment of the ECJ, 250 was in breach of ex Article 28 EC (now Article
34 TFEU), which provides for the free movement of goods.25 1 Likewise,
Factortame, a British company but whose vessels and shareholder were
Spanish, claimed damages against the UK arising from the Merchant
Shipping Act.252 In Factortame H, the Court found that 253
the Act was
incompatible with ex Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU).
The differences between Brasserie and Francovich are twofold.
First, whereas in Francovich the EU measure infringed was not directly
enforceable, both ex Articles 28 and 43 EC (now Articles 34 and 49
TFEU) have direct effect. Second, whereas the damage in Francovich
was the result of Italy's inaction (failure to implement a directive), in
Brasseriethe damage was the direct result of legislative activity.
Therefore, as Germany, Ireland, and the Netherlands argued,
Francovich could have been interpreted restrictively.254 The principle of
state liability should be limited to cases where individuals do not have
alternative remedies. Hence, because ex Articles 28 and 43 EC (now
Articles 34 and 49 TFEU) are directly effective, state liability should be
precluded. Furthermore, applying this principle to cases where the
legislature is involved not only would be contrary to the principle of
separation of powers (it is for the legislature to create remedies and not
for the judiciary), but it would also threaten its independence.25 5

249. See generally Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pcheur SA v.
F.R.G., The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. I1029; Case C-392/93, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury ex parte British Telecomm. Plc.,
1996 E.C.R. 1-1613; Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food ex
parte Hedley Lomas Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-2553; Case C-178/94, Dillenkofer v.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4845.
250. See Case 178/84, Comm'n of the Eur. Cmtys. v. F.R.G., 1978 E.C.R. 1227 (also
known as "Beer Purity Case").
251. See Brasserie, 1996 E.C.R. 3.
252. See id. 9.
253. See generally Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. ex parte
Factortame Ltd., 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905.
254. See Brasserie, 1996 E.C.R. 34.
255. See id. 24.
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However, the ECJ rejected both arguments and decided to expand
Francovich.2 56 It held that direct effect was a "minimum guarantee,"
adding that it was not an adequate remedy in cases where the damage
was already produced.257 As for the principle of separation of powers,
the ECJ pointed out that deciding whether violations of EU law
committed by national legislatures give rise to damages was a "question
of Treaty interpretation which falls within the competences of the
Court." 258 In relation to the independence of the legislature, owing to the
fact that all domestic authorities are bound by EU law, the ECJ deduced
that the violation of EU law should be attributed to the member state as a
whole. 259 The fact that the infringing authority was the legislature is thus
irrelevant. As a result, the ECJ ruled that in so far as the conditions of
liability are fulfilled, legislative activity in breach of EU law may give
rise to financial reparation.2 6 °
As for the conditions of liability, the ECJ introduced the new
concept of serious breach. 26' The ECJ recognised that in implementing
EU policies member states may enjoy some discretion.262 Therefore, not
every violation of EU law gives rise to a right to reparation. In addition,
the infringing member state must have "manifestly and gravely
disregarded the limits on its discretion. 26 3
Two conclusions can be drawn from Brasserie. First, the ECJ opted
for a cumulative use of remedies and upgraded state liability from a
specific solution to a remedial gap (the lack of horizontal direct effect of
directives) to a general principle of EU law. 264 This means that the
principle of state liability applies regardless of whether injured parties
may seek for prospective relief. Therefore, this case demonstrates that
not only is the ECJ determined to create new remedies, but it is also
willing to defend their universal application. Second, the concept of
serious breach appears to be consistent with the principle of effectiveness
of EU law, whilst avoiding over-deterrence on member states by the
prospect of actions for damages.

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See id. 20.
See id.
See id. 27.
See Brasserie, 1996 E.C.R.
See id.
See id. 55.
See id. T 47.
See id. T 55.
See Brasserie, 1996 E.C.R.

36.

23-34.
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Conditions of State Liability

Although based on the general tort principle of neminen laedere,
state liability of public authorities has special features, such as the
attainment of tasks of general interests, which may limit its scope in
various ways. In fact, in order to preserve a fair balance between public
interests and private rights, any breach of EU law does not lead inter alia
to a right to reparation. Therefore, member states' unlawfulness is not
always automatically translated into state liability.
It is thus indispensable that additional requirements are met,
namely:
(1) the law infringed was intended to confer rights to
individuals, (2) the existence of a serious breach, and (3) a direct causal
link between the violation of EU law and the damage. Whereas the
existence of the two first conditions can be determined by the ECJ
through a preliminary reference procedure, determining whether there is
a direct causal link falls within the competences of the national courts.
Moreover, the ECJ has pointed out that the member states are not
precluded from lowering down the threshold of liability under national
law.265 It follows that by announcing these three conditions, the ECJ
compelled the member states to attain a minimum degree of diligence
while acting in the sphere of EU law. It is to the study of these three
cumulative conditions that this article now turns.
1.

First Condition: The Law Infringed Was Intended to Confer
Rights on Individuals

As Francovich shows, this first condition cannot be confused with
direct effect. Indeed, a EU provision can be "intended to confer rights on
individuals" and nevertheless, not be unconditional or lack sufficient
precision to be directly effective. 266 Put differently, a non-directly
effective provision can give rise to state liability. Indeed, by contrast to
direct effect, in order to determine whether an EU provision is intended
to confer rights to individuals, it is sufficient that the beneficiary of that
right and its content are ascertainable. It is not necessary for the EU
provision to determine against whom this right may be enforced. It
follows that for the purpose of state liability, conferring EU rights is a
less stringent requirement than the "sufficient precision and
unconditionality" of direct effect.
Furthermore, EU provisions intending to confer rights on
individuals must aim at protecting specific or individual interests, and
265. See id. 66.
266. Sacha Prechal, Member State Liability and Direct Effect: What's the Difference
After All?, 17 EUR. Bus. L. REv. 299 (2006).
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not only merely public or general interests. The question than then arises
is whether the protection of individual interests must be the main
objective of the EU provision, or whether it suffices that individual
interests are included in its general scope of protection. 67 Until Peter
Paul,268 it appeared that the ECJ's answer was that the protection of
individual interests as the specific goal of the EU measure was not
required. 269 However, in Peter Paul, the ECJ took a different approach.
The ECJ held that from the fact that banking directives impose
obligations on regulatory authorities vis-A-vis credit institutions, or that
the protection of depositors is also included among their objectives, it
does not follow that these directives intended to confer rights on
individuals as a result of defective supervision. 270 By ensuring the
mutual recognition of authorizations and of prudential supervision
systems, the ECJ stressed that banking directives focussed on
harmonizing the banking sector and consequently, liability for defective
supervision fell outside their scope.271 As a result, Peter Paul evinces
that the protection of individual interests cannot be an incidental
objective of the EU law provision. An EU law provision will be deemed
to confer rights on individuals where it directly seeks to protect them.
2.

Second Condition: Serious Breach

In Brasserie, the ECJ held that a breach of EU law is sufficiently
serious where the member state concerned "has manifestly and gravely
disregarded the limits of its discretion., 272 In paragraph 56, the ECJ gave
some guidelines to be taken into account by national courts when
considering the seriousness of the breach, namely
[T]he clarity and precision of the rule breached, the measure of
discretion left by that rule to the national or [EU] authorities, whether
the infringement and the damage caused was intentional or
involuntary, whether any error of law was excusable or inexcusable,
the fact that the position taken by [an EU] institution may have
contributed towards the omission, and the adoption or retention of
national measures or practices contrary to Community law.... On
any view, a breach of Community law will clearly be sufficiently
serious if it has persisted despite a judgment finding the infringement
267. Id. at 310-15.
268. See Case C-222/02, Paul v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2004 E.C.R. 1-9425.
269. Case C-178/94, Dillenkofer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1996 E.C.R. 1-4845,
36-39.
270. See Paul,2004 E.C.R. 39-47.
271. See id. ff 40-43.

272. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du P~cheur SA v. F.R.G., and The

Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. exparte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 55.
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in question to be established or a preliminary ruling or settled caselaw of the Court on the matter from which
it is clear that the conduct
2 73
in question constituted an infringement.
Thus, it seems that the seriousness of the breach is intrinsically
linked to the notion of discretion. The more discretion enjoyed by the
member state, the less likely it is for the breach to be serious.
Conversely, where member states have no discretion, a minor breach of
EU law would suffice to meet the "sufficiently serious breach" threshold.
In this sense, in Dillenkofer2 74 the ECJ held that because Germany did
not enjoy any discretion to defer the implementation of Directive
90/314/EEC,2 75 its late transposition was per se a serious breach.276
Likewise in Hedley Lomas'2 77 the United Kingdom had refused to issue
export licences of live sheep to Spain on the sole ground that Spanish
slaughter houses did not comply with Directive 74/577/EEC.2 78 The
English Court referred two questions to the ECJ.2 7 9 First, it asked
whether the United Kingdom could rely on ex Article 30 EC (now
Article 36 TFEU) to refuse to issue exports licences.28 ° Second, if the
first question was answered in the negative, did traders, who had suffered
loss caused by the United Kingdom's failure to grant export licences,
have a right to reparation? 281 The ECJ answered that the directive
273. Id. 56. In this sense, in relation to the German law on Beer Purity, the ECJ
held that German provisions which prohibited the marketing under the designation of
"bier" of products manufactured in accordance with rules other than the
"Biersteuergesetz, "were clearly a serious breach. Id. 59. The reason being is that under
its previous ruling Cassis de Dijon, German law would be clearly incompatible and thus,
it could not be seen as an excusable error. Id. Conversely, since its case law on the use of
additives was not clearly defined, the ECJ stated that German provisions banning the use
of additives could not be considered as a serious breach. Id. In the same way,
concerning the Merchant Shipping Act, the ECJ stated that by enacting provisions which
required British nationality as a condition for registration of vessels, UK legislation was
directly discriminatory and hence, it had committed a serious breach. Id. 61. However,
in relation to the requirements of residence and domicile, the ECJ held that, though these
conditions breached primafacie ex Article 43 EC (now Article 49 TFEU), the UK had
sought to justify them under common fisheries policy. Id. IT 62-63.
274. Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R.
26-27.
By contrast, a plaintiff seeking
compensation from a member state, which has defectively implemented a directive before
the deadline, would need to prove the seriousness of the infringement. See Case C392/93, The Queen v. H.M. Treasury ex parte British Telecomm. Plc., 1996 E.C.R. I163 1; see also Case C-63/01, Evans v. Sec'y of State for the Env't, Transp., the Regions,
2003 E.C.R. 1-14447.
275. Council Directive 90/314, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59 (EC).
276. Dillenkofer, 1996 E.C.R. 26-27.
277. Case C-5/94, The Queen v. Ministry of Agric., Fisheries & Food exparte Hedley
Lomas, 1996 E.C.R. 1-2553.
278. Council Directive 74/577, 1974 O.J. (L 316) 10-11 (EC).
279. Hedley Lomas, 1996 E.C.R. 13.
280. Id.
281. Id.
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precluded member states from relying on ex Article 30 EC (now Article
36 TFEU), and thus, the United Kingdom could not justify its violation
of the freedom to export goods.282 As for the possibility of claiming
damages, the ECJ pointed out that, because the United Kingdom did not
enjoy any discretion, its refusal to issue export licenses was considered to
be a serious breach.2 83
Furthermore, in Haim 11,284 the ECJ held that in order to determine
the seriousness of the breach, the degree of discretion enjoyed by
domestic authorities under national law is irrelevant. It is only by
reference to EU law that discretion must be measured.285
Finally, in Brasserie,the ECJ indicated that the concept of serious
breach cannot be regarded as the possibility of making reparation
conditional upon the existence of intentional fault or negligence. 286 It
notion, which go
clarified that additional requirements based on this
287
forbidden.
are
breach,
serious
of
concept
the
beyond
Therefore, despite the fact that the concept of serious breach gives
some flexibility to the national judiciary, the ECJ has introduced a
measure of uniformity. Indeed, national courts must not pay attention to
the intentions of the infringing state, but to the general circumstances in
which the breach occurred. As a result, it seems that "serious breach" is
based on objective criteria.
3.

Third Condition: Direct Causal Link

As mentioned above, it is for the national court to decide whether
there is a direct casual link between the breach of EU law and the
damage suffered. However, this does not mean that causation must be
seen as a wholly national concept.2 88 It is true that causation must be
inferred from the facts of the case and thus, national courts are in a better
position to determine its existence. Nonetheless, the ECJ's guidance
factor may affect
remains necessary in order to clarify how the causality
289
the vertical and horizontal allocation of damages.
282. Id.921.
283. Id. 25.
284. Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahnarztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, 2000
E.C.R. 1-5123, 40.
285. Id.
286. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pecheur SA v. F.R.G., and The
Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. exparte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. $$ 79-80.
287. See generally V. King, The Fault Issue in State Liability: From Francovich to
Dillenkofer, 18 EUR. COMPETITION L. REv. 110 (1997).
288. See Panagiotis Takis Tridimas, Liabilityfor Brach of Community Law: Growing
Up and Mellowing Down?, 38 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 301 (2001).
289. See Goergios Anagnostaras, Not as Unproblematic as You Might Think: The
Establishmentof Causationin Government Liability Actions, 27 EuR. L. REv. 663 (2002).
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In this regard, there are four factors which may break the chain of
causation, namely interventions by the EU institutions, by a different
public authority, by a third party and by the injured party itself.290 First,
when national authorities are required to implement an EU measure
leaving no room for discretion and their act is subsequently struck down
by the ECJ, the damages resulting from its unlawfulness cannot be
attributed to the member states.29 ' Indeed, there is no casual link
between national implementing measures and the damage occurred,
instead the plaintiff should claim damages against the EU institution
which adopted the unlawful act. Second, in Brinkmann,292 the ECJ
offered the possibility for Danish administrative authorities to correct the
294
293
failure of the legislature to implement Directive 79/32/EEC on time.
Although this legislative failure is a serious breach, the ECJ pointed out
that the immediate effect given by the administrative authorities to the
directive interrupted the chain of causation. 295 Thus, in accordance with
Brinkmann, even if the ECJ considers that a violation of EU law is
attributable to the state as a whole, this does not prevent different
national authorities from cooperating with each other to ensure that EU
law is observed. Third, third parties who infringe EU law may also
interrupt the chain of causation. A good illustration is provided by cases
where third parties deliberately violate EU law and a member state fails
to adopt any measure putting an end to such violations. 296 It is true that
the ECJ has held that the passive behaviour of member states can
constitute a failure to fulfil a member state's obligations under the treaty,
however, this does not mean that state liability would arise. In fact, one
could argue that the behaviour from which the damage arose was not
caused by the State, but by a third party and consequently, a casual link
is missing. In addition, if the EU provision breached has horizontal
direct effect, pursuant to Courage,297 the injured party could directly seek
compensation from the infringing party. As a result, in order for national
courts to determine the existence of a casual link, third parties behaviour
must be taken into consideration. Finally, in Brasserie, the ECJ stated
that there is a duty of mitigation on the injured party, whereby the injured
party must, as far as possible, do everything to avoid or limit any loss or
290. Id. at 669.
291. See Case 106/87, Asteris AE v. Hellenic Republic, 1988 E.C.R. 5515.
292. Case C-319/96, Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH v. Skatteministeriet, 1998
E.C.R. 1-5255.
293. Council Directive 79/32, 1979 O.J. (L 10) 8-10 (EC).
294. Brinkmann Tabakfabriken GmbH, 1998 E.C.R. 1-5255.
295. Id.
28-29.
296. Case C-265/95, Comm'n of the European Cmtys. v. French Republic, 1997
E.C.R. 1-6959.
297. C-453/99, Courage Ltd. v. Crehan, 2001 E.C.R. 1-6297.
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damage.298 In particular, the injured party must "avail himself in time of
all the legal remedies available to him., 299 Thus, if the latter does not
fulfil his duty of mitigation, a causal link could be missing. However, it
does not follow from the foregoing that all remedies must be used before
claiming damages, regardless of their probability of success. Indeed, in
Metallgesellschatf,3 °° the ECJ held that the duty of mitigation is only
applicable in relation to remedies which have the prospect of being
upheld.3 '
Consequently, the direct causal link requirement cannot be taken as
a given and it may be relied upon by the national courts as an escape
mechanism to avoid rendering the infringing member state liable for
damages. In this sense, after Brasserie was delivered and sent back to
Germany, the German court held that element of causation was missing
because of the fact that the damages were caused by multiple breaches
and since the plaintiff did not prove the correlation between the ones
deemed serious and the damage suffered.30 2
F.

Liability of the National Judiciary

In Brasserie, by indicating that the principle of state liability is
applicable to the member states as a whole, regardless of whether the
breach of EU Law has been committed by the legislature, the executive
or the judiciary, the ECJ supported its universal application.30 3 This view
was ratified in K6bler v. Austria,30 4 where the ECJ was called upon to
decide for the first time on the liability of national courts of last
instance.305
The fact of the case can be summarised as follows. Professor
K6bler applied for a special length-of-service increment granted to
university professors who had completed a 15-year service in Austrian
universities.30 6 However, his application was dismissed on the grounds
that his years of service in other European universities could not be taken
into account.30 7 He challenged this decision, arguing that Austrian law
298. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pcheur SA v. F.R.G., and The
Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. exparte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 84-85.

299. Id. T 84.
300. Joined Cases C-397/98 & C-410/98, Metallgesellschaft Ltd. v. Comm'rs of
Inland Revenue, 2001 E.C.R. 1-1727.
301. Id.
302. Case Summary: Brasseriedu Pdcheur SA v. Germany, 1 C.M.L.R. 971 (1997).
303. Brasserie, 1996 E.C.R. 32.
304. See Case C-224/01, K6bler v. Republik Osterreich, 2003 E.C.R. 1-10239.
305. See Case C- 173/03, Traghetti del Mediterraneo SpA v. Repubblica Italiana, 2006
E.C.R. 1-5177.
306. See K'bler,2003 E.C.R. 6.
307. See id. 6.
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was in breach of the free movement of workers.3 °8 The case reached the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof (Austrian Supreme Administrative Court) which
requested a preliminary reference to the ECJ.30 9 Before the question was
answered, the ECJ delivered Schining-Kougebetopolou310 There, it
ruled that a collective agreement which denies promotion on grounds of
seniority to public employees, who have completed comparable
employment in the public service of another member state, was in breach
of the free movement of workers. 3 11 Thus, the registrar of the ECJ asked
the Verwaltungsgerichtshof whether in the light of this case, it
considered necessary to maintain its request for a preliminary
reference.31 2 It follows that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had two options,
either to uphold Professor K6bler's claim or to maintain its request.
Nevertheless, the Verwaltungsgerichtshof took a different approach. It
withdrew the preliminary reference, but dismissed his claim, holding that
the length-of-service could be qualified as a loyalty bonus and thus, it
was a justified derogation from the free movement of workers.3 13 As a
result, Professor K6bler filed an action in damages against the Austrian
State before the Regional Civil Court of Vienna.314 He alleged that by
infringing its obligations under ex Article 234 EC (now Article 267
TFEU) and by misinterpreting the case-law of the ECJ, the
Verwaltungsgerichtshof had infringed EU law, and consequently, he was
entitled to reparation. 315 The Regional Civil Court of Vienna made a
reference to the ECJ.316 It asked whether the principle of state liability
was applicable to national courts of last instance, and if so, what were the
conditions for the imposition ofjudicial liability.317 It also asked whether
3 18
compensation could be awarded to Professor K6bler.
First, the ECJ held that the principle of state liability was applicable
to violations of EU law committed by the judicial branch of the member
state. 3 19 Because infringing states are seen as a single entity under
international law, afortiori states must also be viewed as a whole under
308. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 45, Mar. 25, 1957, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 64; Council Regulation 1612/68, art. 7, 1968
O.J. (L 257) 2-12 (EC).
309. See K6bler 2003 E.C.R. 7.
310. Case C-15/96, Sch6ning-Kougebetopoulou v. Freie und Hansestadt Hamburg,
1998 E.C.R. 1-47.
311. See K6bler 2003 E.C.R. 30.
312. See id. 8.
313. Seeid. 10-11.
314. See id. 12.
315. See id.
316. See Kbler,2003 E.C.R. 14.
317. See id.
318. Id.
319. Seeid. 32-33.
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EU law. 320 The ECJ added that pursuant to the principle of effectiveness,
EU rights would be weakened if individuals were precluded from
obtaining reparation where national courts of last instance violate EU
law.32 1 Consequently, the ECJ acknowledged that, becuase a decision of
a court of last instance in breach of EU law cannot be repealed,
individuals must be provided with an alternative way to protect their
rights.322 Thus, rendering national courts of last instance liable prevents
violations of EU rights from being unsolved.323
The ECJ also
acknowledged that liability of the324
judiciary had been recognised by the
European Court of Human Rights.
In addition, the ECJ dismissed the arguments of the United
Kingdom, according to which state liability for judicial acts not only
would undermine the independence of the judiciary, but it would also be
3 25 The ECJ replied that because
contrary to the principle of resjudicata.
it is the state which is liable and not the judge in his personal capacity,
there is no threat to the independence of the judiciary.326 Additionally,
the ECJ rejected that the principle of state liability would undermine the
authority of the national courts of last instance.32 7 On the contrary, the
ECJ opined that it would "enhance the quality of a legal system" and "in
the long run [its] authority.. ,328 Likewise, there is no violation of the
principle of resjudciata,since an action in damages has neither the same
purpose
nor necessarily the same parties as the original underlying
9
suit.

32

As for the conditions of liability, the ECJ held that they remain the
same. 330 However, the ECJ pointed out that, in light of the special role of
the judiciary and legal certainty, national courts of last instance should
only incur in liability in exceptional circumstances, that is, where there is
a manifest infringement of the law applicable. 33' Indeed, by contrast to
the executive and the legislature, the degree of discretion is not an
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.

See id. 32.
See K6bler, 2003 E.C.R.
See id. 36.
Id. 31-35.
See id. T 49.
Id. 25-26.

33.

326. See Kobler, 2003 E.C.R. 42.
327. See id. 943.
328. See id.
329. Id. 39-43. However, this argument does not appear to be entirely convincing.
See Claus D. Classen, Case Note: Kdbler v. Republik Osterreich, 41 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 813 (2004) (holding that it is very difficult to see how the national court in charge
of solving the claim for damages will not go into reviewing the lawfulness of the ruling
of the national court of last instance).
330. See Kdbler, 2003 E.C.R.
51-52.
331. Id. 52-56.
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appropriate parameter to measure the seriousness of the breach
committed by national courts of last instance. 332 Instead, liability will be
determined by assessing, for instance, the degree of clarity and precision
of the rule infringed, whether the breach was intentional, whether it was
erroneous, or whether the national court of last instance violated its
obligation to refer under ex Article 234, third indent, EC (now Article
267, third indent, TFEU).
Finally, the ECJ held that its findings in Schoning-Kougetopoulou
were applicable to the case at issue. 333 Consequently, the Austrian
length-of-service scheme was contrary to EU law. However, the ECJ
considered that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had not committed a serious
breach.334 First, there was no previous case law of the ECJ on whether
loyalty bonus could be a justified derogation from free movement.335
Second, although by withdrawing its request for a preliminary reference,
the Verwaltungsgerichtshof committed a procedural violation of ex
Article 234 EC (now Article 267 TFEU), the ECJ considered that its
seriousness was extenuated by the fact that the withdrawal was prompted
by a misinterpretation of Schdning-Kougebetopolou.336 Hence, the ECJ
concluded that the Verwaltungsgerichtshof had not manifestly and
seriously breached EU law. 337 Prof. K6bler was not entitled to
reparation. 338
It is noteworthy to point out that, while courts of last instance have
an obligation to refer, inferior courts enjoy full discretion. The ECJ
indicated in Brasserie that the person who has suffered damage for
breach of EU law has a duty of mitigation, which may include pursuing
"all legal remedies available to him," such as appealing judicial decisions
inconsistent with EU law. 339 This means that, in light of the duty of
mitigation imposed on the injured party and the obligation to refer of
national courts, under EU law, the principle of state liability for acts of
the judiciary is confined to those emanating from national courts of last
instance.

332.
333.

TRIDIMAS, supra note 189, at 524.
Kobler, 2003 E.C.R.
81-86.

334.

Id.

335. Id. 80.
336. Id. 123.
337. Id. 117-124.
338. However, AG Leger was more demanding with the Austrian Court and
understood that Mr K6bler was entitled to reparation. See Kobler, 2003 E.C.R. 1 170
(opinion ofAG Leger)
339. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Pcheur SA v. F.R.G., and The
Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. exparte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 1 8485.
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Furthermore, not only is K6bler the logical continuation of the caselaw of the ECJ on state liability, but it also introduces significant
constitutional changes. On the one hand, Kibler highlights that none of
the branches of government can escape from faithfully fulfilling its
duties under EU law. In the same way, by ratifying the three-pronged
test enounced in Brasserie, the ECJ resisted the assault of several
member states urging for the introduction of more stringent conditions of
liability. On the other hand, its innovative feature lies in that it modifies,
to a certain extent, the relationships between the ECJ and national courts
of last instance. In accordance with ex Article 234, third indent, EC
(now Article 267, third indent, TFEU), where in order to solve the case,
national courts of last instance are called upon to interpret EU law, the
treaty requires the latter to seek guidance from the ECJ by requesting a
preliminary reference. The rationale behind this obligation is to create a
common understanding of the EU Law by "(nothing) other than the
expression of a mechanism of judicial cooperation and mutual trusts
between courts. 34 0 In CILFIT, the ECJ tolerated that the obligation to
refer imposed on national courts of last instance did not apply in cases
where "the correct application of EU law may be so obvious as to leave
no scope for any reasonable doubt as to the manner in which the question
raised is to be resolved.. ." and "the matter is equally obvious the courts
of the other member states and to the Court of Justice., 34 1 Thus, by
giving up its place as final interpreter of the EU law to the national courts
of last instance in cases where the interpretation of EU law is obvious,
the ECJ acknowledged the contribution of these national courts in the
interpretation and application of EU law. However, the Treaty does not
provide any means to prevent or to sanction a misuse of the CILFIT
doctrine. Because there is no appeal to the ECJ, before K6bler there was
no remedy against a national court of last instance infringing its
obligations under ex Article 234 EC (now Article 267 TFEU). Thus,
Kobler can be read as a curtailment to this doctrine, which also provides
a remedial answer to a structural need. Indeed, as Professor Tridimas
points out, national courts of last instance will think twice before
applying CILFIT and would rather "play safe. 342 In this regard, by
upholding the liability of the national judiciary, the ECJ has introduced a
federal element capable of establishing its leadership in the relationship
with national courts. As discussed below, liability for judicial acts can
be seen as a functional substitute to the absence of an appellate

340. Kobler, 2003 E.C.R. T1 1I (opinion of AG Leger).
341. Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health, 1982 E.C.R. 3415, 16.
342. For critical view of K6bler, see Peter J.Wattel, Kobler, CILFIT & Welthgrove:
We Can't Go On Meeting Like This, 41 COMMON MKT: L. REv. 177 (2004).
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jurisdiction over national courts' decisions. Consequently, state liability
for judicial acts demonstrates that the ECJ sees itself as "the Supreme
Court of the European Union." If "cooperation and mutual trust" define
the "ECJ-national courts" relations, liability of the national judiciary
allocates the role played by each party in the EU legal order.
III. STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES AND STATE FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
The historical context in which the principles of sovereign
immunity of states and of state liability for damages arose may provide
the explanation of a ruling in an individual case. However, history is not
sufficient in itself to explain subsequent developments in the case-law.
Indeed, history may not in itself justify the constitutional value attributed
to these two principles.
While the enactment of the Eleventh
Amendment provides the constitutional basis for state sovereign
immunity, it is not a solid reason in itself to justify its extensive
application. In the same way, the fact that state liability first appeared as
an adequate solution to the non-transposition of directives does not
explain its subsequent application to directly effective provisions.
Accordingly, this section tries to explain why the U.S. Supreme
Court and the ECJ have taken different stands towards state liability for
damages. It is first argued that structural differences between the federal
architectural design of the United States and of the EU provide valuable
insights as to why the U.S. Supreme Court persistently refuses to render
states liable for breach of federal law, whereas the ECJ considers state
liability as remedy vital to the full effectiveness of EU law. In addition,
whereas the ECJ does not pay much attention to the adverse economic
impacts of its rulings on member states, the U.S. Supreme Court
considers the financial integrity of the state treasuries as a key element of
its vision of federalism. Thus, the interplay between retrospective and
prospective remedies and the state treasuries may shed some light on this
issue.
A.

Structuraldifferences: EU Directives and the Principleof "AntiCommandeering"
I.

Some Theoretical Views on Commandeering

There are two ways in which "central ' 343 and state authorities may
interact, namely either the central government is empowered to employ
States as regulatory agencies or not.
343. In order to avoid confusions, the term "central" instead of "federal" is preferred
in this section.
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Where the central government is empowered to rely on component
states, it may do so in two ways. The central government may lay down
a general framework within which states must adopt policy measures.345
Thus, the central government adopts "policy-making" commands which,
as a general rule, are addressed to state legislatures.34 6 Or, the central
government may adopt policy measures in their entirety, leaving their
execution to state authorities.34 7 Consequently, the central government
may issue "executive-enforcing" commands, often addressed to the state
administrative authorities.348
Furthermore, where the central government commands component
states, the effectiveness of federal law is intrinsically linked to the
effectiveness of central commands. The better component states perform
their implementing duties, the more effective "central law" will be.349
Conversely, where the central government is not empowered to
command states, "central law" can only grant rights to or impose
It follows that, because the central
obligations on individuals.
government is not empowered to rely on state legislative and
administrative apparatus, a strong federal bureaucracy is of a paramount
importance in order to secure proper federal law enforcement.3 5 °
As a result, where commandeering is possible, the effectiveness of
central law depends on the strength of central commands. On the
contrary, if the constitutional text precludes the central government from
relying on states, then the effectiveness of central law would depend on
the enforcement capacities of the central government alone.
2.

The EU and the United States

In Europe, the EU institutions have both the power to legislate
directly upon individuals and to compel Member States to implement EU
policies.

344. Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Issue of Commandeering,
in THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE U.S. AND THE
EU 213-15 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001).
345. Id. at 230-34.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Moreover, from the standpoint of individual rights, this distinction also seems
relevant. In relation to "policy making" commands, owing to the fact that states may
enjoy some, albeit limited, discretion, state legislative intervention is required in order to
fully concretise individual rights. See Halberstam, supra note 344, at 230. However,
where "executive-enforcement" commands are issued, individual rights have already
been defined by the central government. State intervention is not necessary to define their
scope. It is only required to enforce them. Id.
349. Id. at 238-42.
350. Id.
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By adopting EU regulations,3 5' the EU institutions may grant rights
to and impose obligations on individuals. EU Regulations can also issue
"executive-commands" addressed to the member states. 35 2 However,
since there is no need for further implementing measures, EU
Regulations do not lay down "policy-making" commands. Moreover,
regulations are directly effective and thus, individuals can rely on them
before national courts to enforce EU rights. Thus, state intervention is
not necessary in order to give full effect to individual EU rights.
By contrast, EU directives 353 are not addressed to individuals but to
the member states. When the EU institutions adopt a directive, member
states are obliged to attain a certain result, but they enjoy some discretion
as to the means to be deployed in implementation. Therefore, member
states are required to enact or adapt national legislation pursuant to the
"policy-making" commands laid down in the directive. Further, in order
for EU rights embodied in a directive to be fully directly effective,
member states must enact legislation. In other words, state intervention
is required. Thus, when implementing a directive, member states act as
EU agents.
On the contrary, in the United States, in accordance with the judicial
principle of "anti-commandeering, 3 54 Congress lacks powers to use
states as implementers of regulation. In the U.S. Supreme Court's
opinion, the framers of the U.S. Constitution thought that the confederate
method, according to which congressional powers targeted the states and
not the individuals, was inappropriate in order to create a strong central
government.355 The Framers decided that Congress should only be
vested with the power to legislate with respect to individuals (e.g. power
to tax, to regulate interstate commerce), 35 6 who, in Hamilton's words, are
"the only proper objects of government., 357 The U.S. Supreme Court has
further found that where the subject matter is not pre-empted by the
federal government and the latter commands states to implement its
351. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 288, Mar. 25, 1957, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 171 ("A regulation shall have general
application. It shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member
States.").
352.

See, e.g., Council Regulation 1210/2003, 2003 O.J. (L. 169) 6-23 (EC); Council

Regulation 1/2003, 2003 O.J. (L. 1) 1-25 (EC).
353. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
art. 288, Mar. 25, 1957, 2008 O.J. (C 115) 172 ("A directive shall be binding, as to the

result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to
the national authorities the choice of form and methods.").
354. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264
(1981); see also FERC v. Miss., 456 U.S. 742 (1982).

355.
356.
357.

N.Y. v. U.S, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
See FERC, 456 U.S. at 762-66.
THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 76 (Alexander Hamilton) (Goldman ed., 2008).
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policies, state officials cannot act in accordance with the views of their
electorate.358 Consequently, accountability between federal and state
governments is blurred.3 59 In other words, commandeering disturbs the
allocation of political responsibilities between these two levels of
governance and it makes it impossible for the electorate to determine the
institutional origin of any decision.
Moreover, not only is the principle of anti-commandeering
applicable to the state legislative branch, but also to the executive one.
Therefore, the U.S. Supreme Court understands that the U.S.
Constitution prohibits both "policy-making"
and "executiveenforcement" commands.36 °
However regarding states courts, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that commandeering is possible.3 6' In its view, the reason for this
distinction lies in Articles III and VI of the U.S. Constitution. 362 Article
III only provides for "a Supreme Court," leaving the creation of lower
federal courts to congressional discretion.363 This option is known as the
"Madisonian Compromise. ''364 Congress could have relied exclusively
on state courts to enforce federal law. In the same way, in Article VI
there is no constitutional provision directed to state legislatures that is
similar to the judge clause.365
Accordingly, even though the
constitutional design precludes commandeering state executive and
legislative branches, the supremacy clause and the Madisonian
Compromise authorise Congress to command state courts to enforce
federal law.
Although Congress cannot oblige states to implement its policies, it
is nonetheless entitled to provide some incentives. It follows that this
principle does not prevent Congress from encouraging states to regulate
in compliance with its policies. In New York v. United States,36 6 the U.S.
Supreme Court indicated that the difference between encouraging and
compelling is that, while the former allows state officials to remain
accountable to local preferences, 367 the latter does not. It is true that in
358. N.Y, 505 U.S. at 169.
359. Id. at 166-69.
360. See Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997); see also Evan H. Caminker, Printz,
State Sovereignty and the Limits of Formalism,1997 SuP. CT. REV. 199 (1997).
361. SeePrintz,521 U.S. at 907.
362. Id.
363. Id. (holding that "Article III, § 1, established only a Supreme Court, and made
the creation of lower federal courts optional with the Congress-even though it was
obvious that the Supreme Court alone could not hear all federal cases throughout the
United States").
364. See id.
365. See NY., 505 U.S. 144, 178-79 (1992).
366. See id.
367. Id., at 168.
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order for states to benefit from federal incentives, they are required to
follow Congress' instructions. However, if a state decides to align its
legislation to congressional wishes and then, fails to do so, there will be
no constitutional violation. It will simply loose its right to federal
incentives. Accordingly, even if states consent to follow Congress'
instructions, they cannot be considered as federal agents.
As a result, whereas European member states may be required by
the EU institutions to act as their agents, this possibility is precluded in
the United States.
3.

State Liability and Commandeering

In relation to state liability, states may commit two types of
infringements: omitting to give full effect to federal/EU rights, or
actively breaching federal/EU legislation granting rights to individuals.
This section will focus on the first type of breach.
In Europe, the first type of violation corresponds to member states'
failure to implement a directive. In this sense, if a Member State fails to
transpose a directive, it is settled case law that individuals would not be
able to enforce EU rights against other individuals (non-horizontal direct
effect of directives).36 8 Consequently, Member States' inaction hinders
the effectiveness of EU law.
Thus, in order to ensure 1'effet utile of directives, the ECJ was
obliged to find ways which would deter member states from disobeying
EU commands. At first, by holding that after the implementation
deadline, individuals could rely on non-implemented directives against
infringing states (vertical direct effect),369 the ECJ prevented member
states from benefiting from their own infringements. In the same way, in
Foster v. British Gas,370 by widening the concept of state, the ECJ
simultaneously extended the scope of vertical direct effect of
3 72 that national courts
directives.3 71 Second, the ECJ held in Marleasing
are required to interpret national law "in the light of the wording and
purpose" of the directive.373 Accordingly, where national law can be
interpreted in different ways, national courts must choose the one which
368. See Case 152/84, Marshall v. Southampton and South-West Hampshire Area
Health Auth., 1986 E.C.R. 723; Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl., 1994 E.C.R. I3325.
369. See Case C-9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1971 E.C.R. 825; Case C41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337; Case C-148/78, Pubblico Ministero
v. Ratti, 1979 E.C.R. 1629.
370. See Case C-188/89, Foster v. British Gas plc., 1990 E.C.R. 1- 3313.
371. See id.
372. See Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Interacional de
Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135.

373.

See id.
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is consistent with the non-implemented directive. Therefore, both
vertical direct effect and consistent interpretation can be seen as deterring
mechanisms against member states' disobedience of EU commands.
However, these mechanisms are limited. In fact, they do not provide an
effective remedy in cases where national law does not leave any room for
judicial interpretation and where an individual seeks to rely on EU rights
contained in a non-implemented directive against another individual. In
such cases, the effectiveness of the non-implemented directive is
seriously jeopardized.
Finally, the principle of state liability can be seen as the ultimate
endorsement to EU directives' commands. The principle of state liability
for breach of EU law can be examined under two convergent
perspectives. With respect to the protection of individual's rights, the
principle of state liability can be seen as an effective remedy. Although
individuals cannot rely on EU rights laid down in a directive against
another individual, state liability gives rise to compensation against the
infringing member state.
The principle of state liability can be seen as an economic sanction,
in favour of private individuals from the point of view of the
effectiveness of EU directives. Therefore, by shifting the economic cost
of the non-transposition of a directive from the private parties to the
infringing member state, the latter would be eager to comply with EU
commands. As a matter of fact, in light of the ECJ's case law, failure to
implement a directive is not only the scenario which opened the door to
claims in damages for breach of EU law,374 but it is also the paradigmatic
example of a "serious breach. 3 75 Thus, the rationale of the ECJ is
simple: the combined effect of vertical direct effect, the Marleasing
doctrine, and the principle of state liability would deter member states
from non-implementation of EU directives. The principle of state
liability renders more effective EU commands, and thus, EU law.
The United States Congress legislates directly upon individuals, that
is, federal rights are directly effective without the need for state
intervention. "The failure to implement a directive" scenario simply
does not exist under U.S. constitutional law. State inaction has no
adverse repercussion on federal rights. The states would only act
pursuant to federal policies in so far as they freely consent to do so.
However, as previously mentioned, if they agree to follow the commands
of the federal government and subsequently fail to do so, no
constitutional obligation will be breached, only the right to federal
374. See Case C-6/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.
375. See Case C-178/94, Dillenkofer v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 1996 E.C.R. I4845, 36-39.
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incentives will be lost.376 Therefore, because states do not have a
constitutional obligation to act in compliance with the congressional
mandates, they cannot omit what they are not required to do. With due
regard to the exception of state courts, the effectiveness of federal law
depends on federal authorities alone.
4.

Kobler: A Functional Substitute for the Absence of an
Appellate Jurisdiction

A structural difference may also explain why the ECJ has decided
not to exclude the judiciary from incurring liability for breach of EU law,
whereas in the United States, not only do judges enjoy absolute
immunity from suit, but the U.S. Supreme Court has also a restricted
view on collateral challenges to state court decisions.37 7
The EC Treaty (now replaced by the FEU Treaty) does not provide
any appeal over national courts' decisions. The ECJ does not have an
appellate jurisdiction to review the compatibility of national courts
rulings with EU law. Instead, the treaty provides for a preliminary
reference procedure through which the ECJ and national courts cooperate

376. For instance, Congress may decide to condition the release of federal funds upon
states waiving their immunity. Said differently, conditional spending would allow
Congress to do indirectly that which it could not do directly. To overcome state
immunity, the conditional release of federal funding would have to comply with the three
requirements laid down in South Dakota v. Dole, namely (1) spending must pursue the
general welfare, (2) conditions imposed by Congress must be unambiguous (3) conditions
must not be by themselves unconstitutional. See S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). In
addition, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that conditional spending may not pass the point
at which "pressure turns into compulsion." Id. at 210. Likewise, Dole appears to require
some degree of relatedness between the federal spending program and the conditions
imposed. The U.S. Supreme Court has not determined the level of scrutiny in applying
the coercion test or the relatedness test. When a state refuses to waive its immunity, it
remains uncertain whether the loss of all federal funds would amount to coercion. To this
effect, in College Savings Bank, Justice Scalia pointed out that "where the
constitutionally guarantee protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the
point of coercion is automatically passed.., when what is attached to the refusal to
waive is the exclusion of the state(s) from otherwise lawful activity." Coll. Sav. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999). Does this
mean that Congress may withhold federal funds to non complying states which may
continue to engage in the desired conduct, or is the U.S. Supreme Court endorsing a new
definition of "coercion" whereby a waiver of state immunity automatically amounts to
compulsion? The former option would grant Congress an important leeway to contain
conflicting states. By contrast, the latter option would entail that congressional spending
powers have been significantly curtailed. See Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity:
The Case of FederalRegulation ofIntellectualProperty, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1331, 1373-80
(2001); Choper & Yoo, supra note 173, at 248-53.
377. James E. Pfander, Kdbler v Austria: Expositional Supremacy and Member State
Liability, 17 EuR. Bus. L. REv. 275 (2006); see also Meltzer, supra note 13, at 75-8 1.
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in interpreting EU law. 378 The main difference between a preliminary
reference procedure and an appellate jurisdiction is twofold.3 79 First,
parties do not have a right to appeal. 380 The decision to refer falls within
the exclusive competence of the national court. 381 Second, even though
the ECJ has occasionally provided detailed guidance indicating how a
case should be solved, 382 it is still for the national court to follow and
apply the preliminary ruling.383
The cooperative nature of the
preliminary reference procedure is further demonstrated by the fact that,
though ex Article 234 EC (now Article 267 TFEU) imposes on national
courts of last instance an obligation to refer where the interpretation of
EU law is decisive for the case at issue, the EC Treaty (now replaced by
the FEU Treaty) does not provide any sanction or remedy against its
violation.
Thus, the absence of a remedy against a breach of ex Article 234,
third indent, EC (now Article 267, third indent, TFEU) is an important
weakness of the preliminary reference procedure, not only because
parties injured by judicial action are not protected, but also because
infringing national courts of last instance could threaten the uniform
application and primacy of EU law.3 84
It follows that Kdbler can be read as introducing a functional
substitute to the lack of an appellate jurisdiction. In accordance with
Kiibler, where a court of last instance infringes ex Article 234, third
378. There is no equivalent to the preliminary reference procedure in the United
States. For an argument supporting the transplantation of the preliminary reference
procedure in the United States, see Jeffrey C. Cohen, The European Preliminary
Reference and U.S. Supreme Court Review of State Court Judgments: A Study in
ComparativeFederalism,44 AM. J. COMP. L. 421 (1996).
379. Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004) (giving four characteristics of appellate
review: (1) undoing the determinations of law; (2) binding nature of its review;
(3) unidirectional effect of the rulings of the appellate court; and (4) it is committed to
two functions "error correction" and "enhancing consistency," and also three
characteristics of judicial dialogue: (1) prospective review, (2) bidirectional,
(3) dimension of voluntariness).
380. See Case 44/65, Knappschaft v. Singer, 1965 E.C.R. 1191, 1198; Case C-412/96,
Kainuun Liikenne Oy & Oy Pohjolan Liikenne, 1998 E.C.R. 1-5141,
23; Case C402/98, ATB v. Ministero per le Politiche Agricole, 2000 E.C.R. 1-5501, 29.
381. See sources cited supra note 380.
382. See Case 20/87, Minist~re Public v. Andr6 Gauchard, 1987 E.C.R. 4879, 1 5;
Case C-515/99, Reisch v. Bfirgermeister der Landeshauptstadt Salzburg, 2002 E.C.R. I2157,122.
383. See Case 100/63 Van der Veen v. Bestuur der Sociale Verzekeringsbank, 1964
E.C.R. 565, 572 (English Special Edition); Case C-203/99 Veedfald v. Arhus
Amtskommune, 2001 ECR 1-3569, 31.
384. It is true that ex Article 226 EC (now Article 258 TFEU) enforcement actions
could be seen as a way of enforcing the obligation to refer. See Case C- 129/00, Comm'n
of the Eur. Cmtys. v. Italian Republic, 2003 ECR 1-14637. Nonetheless, injured parties
will not benefit from this type of remedy, which has rather a prospective character.
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indent, EC (now Article 267, third indent, TFEU) and in so far as the
three conditions enounced in Brasserie are fulfilled, the injured party is
entitled to reparation. However, it is very unlikely that the court dealing
with the claim for damages will adjudicate in favour of the plaintiff
without making a reference to the ECJ. First, the claim for damages will
often be heard by a court inferior to the one which committed the breach.
Consequently, it would not feel at ease ruling against its hierarchical
authority. Second, a lack of referral may lead the infringing court to
determine its own infringement and thus, to put into question the
impartiality of the judicial system. 385 Hence, it appears that courts in
charge of solving the claims for damages will often make a reference to
the ECJ. Consequently, the ECJ will often decide whether the national
court of last instance should incur liability. Thus, Kabler fulfils an
analogous function as a direct appeal to the ECJ. It provides a remedial
solution to a structural gap. Although, the cooperative and trustful nature
of a preliminary reference procedure remains, Kabler can be understood
as opening the way for a "de facto" appellate jurisdiction of the ECJ.386
On the contrary, the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction
to review the consistency of state courts decisions with the U.S.
Constitution and federal law.387 Article III of the U.S. Constitution states
that the U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over all the cases
to which the federal judicial power extends. 388 Although it is not
389
expressly stated in the U.S. Constitution, in Martin v Hunter's Lessee,
the U.S. Supreme Court strongly asserted its appellate jurisdiction over
state court decisions. 390 First, pursuant to Article III of the U.S.
Constitution, the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court is
determined by the notion of "case," regardless of the court it comes
from.39' Second, as mentioned above, in light of the Madisonian
Compromise, had Congress decided not to establish federal courts, "the
appellate jurisdiction of the [S]upreme [C]ourt would have nothing to act
upon unless it could act upon cases pending in the states courts. 392
Third, the U.S. Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction ensures that the
U.S. Constitution and federal law are uniformly applied.393 Furthermore,
the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court has always been
385. Jan K6marek, Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building
Coherence in the Community, 42 CoMMON MKT. L. REv. 9 (2005).
386. Id. at 13-16.
387. Meltzer, supra note 13, at 62-64.
388. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
389. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816).
390. See id. at 351.
391. See id. at 327-28.
392. Id. at 340.
393. See Martin, 14 U.S. at 349-50.
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expressly endorsed by Congress in its various judiciary acts.394 It is also
noteworthy that the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court
operates as an ultima ratio remedy; in order to file a direct appeal to the
U.S. Supreme Court, the plaintiff must first conclude his pilgrimage to
state courts.39 5
Furthermore, Kobler can also be understood as a collateral attack to
a decision of a national court of last instance. Although, the ECJ stated
that an action for damages would involve neither the same purpose nor
the same parties, the truth is that an inferior court will often be called
upon to review the consistency of a higher court's findings with EU law.
Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court has been reluctant to allow inferior
federal courts to review the validity of a state court decision with the
3 97
396
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co,
U.S. Constitution and federal law.
after their appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Indiana,
plaintiffs brought a new action before a U.S. District Court alleging that
398
the state court judgment was in breach of the U.S. Constitution.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the U.S. District Court
lacked original jurisdiction.399 Instead, plaintiffs should have filed a
direct appeal before the U.S. Supreme Court against the decision of the
Supreme Court of Indiana. 40 0 Likewise in District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman,4 °1 two applicants challenged an admission rule to
the bar of the District of Columbia which denied access to students
without diplomas from accredited law schools.4 °2 Their actions before
the courts of the District of Columbia were unsuccessful and as a result,
they filed a new action before the U.S. District Court.403 Again, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that it was the only court which could review
decisions of the highest court of a state.40 4 Thus, lower federal courts
lack jurisdiction to review state court decisions. Hence, in light of the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court is
deemed sufficient to secure constitutional and federal rights of private
parties, while preserving their uniform application.
A collateral
challenge will thus become too intrusive into state judicial autonomy.40 5
394. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000).
395. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 685 (5th Ed. 2007).
396. Pfander, supra note 337, at 284-85.
397. Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
398. Id. at414-15.
399. Id. at 416.
400. Id.
401. D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
402. Id. at 465-66.
403. Id. at 468-69.
404. Id. at 482-83.
405. The incompatibility between direct appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court and
collateral challenges is also demonstrated by exceptional cases where due to the fact that
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As a result, Kobler can be considered as an answer to the fact that
the ECJ does not have an appellate jurisdiction over national court
decisions. Thus, state liability for judicial acts operates as a remedial
response to a structural need. By contrast, because the U.S. Supreme
Court is vested with appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions, as
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine shows, it does not need additional means to
enhance its authority.
B.

Remedies and the State Treasuries

The principle of commandeering or its prohibition provides an
answer to the constitutional consequences resulting from state inaction.
Nevertheless, this principle is not sufficient to explain the opposite
approach of both Courts regarding violations of federal/EU law due to
state action. The answer to this question lies in the interplay between
remedies and the state treasuries.
1.

America's Antagonism Between Past Remedies and Future
Rights

One must recall that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that one of
the raisons d 'tre of the Eleventh Amendment is to safeguard states'
financial integrity"40 6 The availability of alternative remedies ensuring
the supremacy of federal law seems to be conditioned upon economic
considerations. Coeur d'Alene demonstrates that prospective relief is
only available in so far as it is not as intrusive as a retroactive claim for
damages. 40 7 Likewise, actions for damages against state officials allow
states to decide whether they indemnify and if so, to calculate, limit and
foresee the economic risks generated by federal violations committed by
their own officials. Accordingly, liability for breach of federal law is
conditioned upon state budgetary policy.
A priori, the U.S. Supreme Court's ultimate aim is to protect the
state treasuries, even if this implies that private individuals or entities
will be deprived from any remedy; that state officials are not deterred
from breaching federal law; or that the supremacy of federal law is not
secured. Notwithstanding cases where Congress has the power to
abrogate state immunity, it appears that private individuals will have
access to justice, provided that the state treasuries are not threatened. It
can be prima facie suggested that economic repercussions on state

direct appeal to the Supreme Court was precluded, a collateral challenge was allowed.
See Fid. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Kan. City v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927).
406. Alden v. Me., 527 U.S. 709, 709 (1999).
407. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,287 (1996).
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budgets are the decisive factor in determining whether private
individuals have an effective remedy to enforce their federal rights
against infringing states. However, in light of Milliken 11,408 this
argument needs to be tweaked.
In Milliken II, the U.S. Supreme Court had to decide whether the
federal courts had the power to order compensatory and remedial
educational programs for school children who had suffered from de jure
segregation. 40 9 These programs would require states to spend millions of
dollars. 4'0 Accordingly, the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to determine
whether an Ex parte Young injunction could have adverse economic
repercussions on the state treasuries. 41 1 The U.S. Supreme Court replied
in the affirmative.412 It held that although desegregation programs were
compensatory in nature, it "does not change the fact that they are part of
a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a
unitary school system. We therefore hold that such prospective relief is
not barred by the Eleventh Amendment."'13
Thus, prospective remedies can have ancillary414 effects on the state
treasuries. Hence, the U.S. Supreme Court draws a distinction between
the economic impact of prospective remedies and that on retrospective
remedies, that is, between new and old property. Whereas retrospective
relief cannot adversely affect the state treasury, the effectiveness of
prospective relief could be seen as a limitation to its absolute protection.
As Professor Jeffries points out, there is an antagonism between
past remedies and future rights, which can be explained as follows. 415 If
constitutional innovation is seen as a positive value, then retroactivity
must be limited. Indeed, in order for the judges to easily depart from
precedent, the impact of their "new law ' 4 16 rulings should be only
prospective, that is, break-through judgments are easier to render if
judges escape from economic considerations of the past. 4 17 It follows
that awarding damages for past claims may be a hindrance to
constitutional innovation and consequently, it should be kept limited as
much as possible. On the contrary, prospective remedies operate as a

408. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 279 (1977); see also Hutton v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 691 (1978).
409. Milliken, 433 U.S. at 269.
410. Id. at 297 n.3.
411. Id. at 288-90.
412. Id. at 290.
413. Id.
414. Hutton, 437 U.S. at 690.
415. John C. Jeffries Jr., The Right-Remedy Gap in ConstitutionalLaw, 109 YALE L.J.
87 (1999).
416. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 8.
417. Jeffries, Jr., supra note 415, at 98-99.
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device that favours constitutional renewal. As a matter of fact, not only
can injunctive remedies be relied upon in cases of ongoing violations of
rights, but they also prevent potential breaches. Hence, they are able to
go beyond the underlying rights, ultimately leading to a remedy-right
transformation. Moreover, since state resources are limited and both
prospective and retrospective remedies are capable of affecting the state
treasuries, the judiciary is required to decide between redressing past
damages and favouring constitutional innovation.4 18 In this sense, the
American constitutional structure of remedies is clearly biased in favour
of the future. By limiting retrospective relief in favour of injunctive and
declaratory remedies, societal resources are shifted from old claimants to
new ones, that is, from old to new property.41 9
However, the distinction between the prospective and retrospective
effects of monetary relief has long been criticised by U.S. scholars who
posit that this distinction gives rise to confusion and that it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to apply. 420 As a matter of fact, even in
Edelman, the seminal case where this distinction was articulated, the
U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that evaluating whether the monetary
effects of an Exparte Young injunction are prospective "will not in many
instances be that between day and night. ' ,421 For instance, it has been
noted that the ruling in Milliken II cannot be reconciled with Edelman,
given that the desegregation order sought to solve past injustices.4 2 As
Currie famously noted, "nobody is ever ordered to have paid
yesterday. ' A23 Conversely, it could be counter-argued that though the
damage done to segregated students constituted a violation to their
constitutional rights, the remedy was not primarily intended to redress
their educational deficiencies.
Instead, it attempted to prevent
prospective black students from suffering the same evil.424 Still, this
reading is problematic because it would imply that the constitutional
violations to the rights of some allow others to benefit from the monetary
implications of prospective remedies. Be that as it may, in so far the
U.S. Supreme Court continues to endorse this remedial dichotomy,
418.
419.
420.

Id. at 105-12.
Id. at 113-14.
See, e.g., David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government

Officers, 1984 SuP. CT. REV. 149 (highlighting the inconsistencies between Edelman and
Milliken II); Amar, supra note 26, at 1480 (qualifying this distinction as incoherent); and
Jackson, supra note 61, at 88 (noting that the distinction has been much criticised).
421. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667 (1974).
422. Currie, supra note 420, at 162.
423. Id.; Vdzquez, supra note 153, at 34 (reading Milliken II as purporting to
compensate victims of past wrongs).
424. Jeffries, Jr., supra note 415, at 109 (opining that the remedy in Milliken II aimed
"to spend additional funds to educate future students rather than to distribute cash
payments to poorly educated past students).
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American courts will continue to struggle in applying this difficult
distinction.42 5
In short, the protection of state treasuries is not absolute. The U.S.
Supreme Court has agreed that it can be ancillary affected in cases where
new property requires protection.4 26 Nevertheless, the state treasuries are
a limit which forces retrospective and prospective remedies into a
dichotomy, which in order to promote constitutional innovation, are
settled in favour of the latter.
2.

The ECJ's Convergent View on Remedies

In his article, Professor Meltzer argues that just as in the United
States, the ECJ also privileges state adherence to EU law over judicial
protection of individual rights. At the same time, it is easier for
applicants to seek injunctive or declaratory relief than to succeed in
bringing a claim in damages. Because the existence of a serious breach
is a condicio sine qua non for state liability, "unless [states] are in rather
obvious violation of federal law, only prospective compliance, not
compensation for past harm caused, will be required. 4 27 The remedial
preference towards prospective remedies also takes place in the EU. On
the other hand, taking the ruling of the ECJ in Kobler as an example,
Meltzer also reckons that with a view to expanding further the principle
of state liability, the ECJ decided not to provide an immediate remedy to
the case at bar. Said differently, even though the ECJ expanded this
remedial principle to the judicial branch of the member states, it did not
rule against the defendant (Austria). As Professor Jeffries noted for
Milliken II, by withholding remedial relief, the ECJ permitted a more
rapid evolution of substantive law in Krbler.4 28
One cannot but disagree with the conclusions drawn by Professor
Meltzer. To begin with, there is a significant difference between denying
state liability in damages in defence of a constitutional principle and not
granting relief to the case at bar after introducing a new principle (or
expanding an old one). The ECJ might have thought that confirming the
application of state liability to the judiciary and simultaneously
condemning Austria to pay damages would have caused excessive
429
political alarm in the member states and in their supreme courts.

425. Vdzquez, supra note 153, at 52-56 (holding that some inferior federal courts
have misread the Edelman ruling as barring all relief having a retrospective effect).
426. Hutton v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
427. Meltzer, supra note 13, at 78, 82-83.
428. Jeffries Jr., supra note 415, at 109-10.
429. This type of judicial strategy is not foreign to the U.S. Supreme Court. Suffice it
to look at Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), where judicial review was introduced
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Nevertheless, by contrast to the American remedial dichotomy, nothing
prevents futures claims in damages against the state judiciary from being
successful. Plaintiffs suffering from segregation after Milliken II was
delivered were not entitled to claim damages against the State either.
Monetary retrospective relief will always be barred in the United States
by the Eleventh Amendment. On the contrary, future plaintiffs may rely
on Kobler in order to seek damages against national courts of last
instance that are in breach of ex Article 234 EC (now Article 267 TFEU).
Said differently, denying judicial relief the first time a principle is
introduced--or subsequently expanded--does not entail its eternal denial
as a matter of principle.
Additionally, while Kobler may be read as a response to a structural
need rather than as a means of fostering the judicial protection of
individual rights, Meltzer's thesis is at odds with Francovich and
Brasserie. From the fact that the existence of a serious breach precludes
an individual from automatically having a right to reparation, it does not
follow that the requirements for prospective relief are easier to meet than
the ones for seeking damages. As Francovich clearly shows, the
availability of both remedies is submitted to a different and independent
set of conditions. The fact that one remedy is unavailable does not
condition the availability of the other.
Most importantly, the ECJ has held that there are no antagonistic
forces between retrospective and prospective remedies. In Brasserie du
P&heur, the ECJ rejected the argument brought by the German, Irish
and Dutch Governments pursuant to which the principle of state liability
for breach of EU law should be limited to non-directly effective
provisions, that is, to cases where prospective relief was not possible.43 °
It held that direct effect was only a "minimum guarantee, 431 and that "the
right to reparation is the necessary corollary of the direct effect of the EU
provision whose breach caused the damage sustained. 43 2 Thus, the ECJ
has a convergent view on prospective and retrospective remedies; the
combined effect of both leads to a complete protection of EU rights.
Moreover, the ECJ's convergent view on remedies may be
explained by the fact that in its rationale, the protection of state treasuries
has not benn an issue. In this regard, Haim 1/433 clearly demonstrates that

in order to quash a congressional statute that would have been very difficult to enforce
against the federal executive.
430. Joined Cases C-46/93 & C-48/93, Brasserie du Prcheur SA v. F.R.G., and The
Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp. exparte Factortame Ltd., 1996 E.C.R. 1-1029, 18.
431. Id. 20.
432. Id. 22.
433. See Case C-424/97, Haim v. Kassenzahniirztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, 2000
E.C.R. 1-5123.
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budgetary policy considerations do not prevent individuals from
receiving full compensation from the member states.434 Mr. Haim was
an Italian national who had studied dentistry in a non-member state
(Turkey), but whose title had been recognised by Belgium. 435 In order to
join the social security scheme as a dental practitioner, he sought to
enroll with the German Association of Dentists (GAD). 436 Nevertheless,
the GAD rejected his application on the ground that he was not covered
by the Council Directive 78/686/EEC on mutual recognition of
diplomas. 437 In Haim ,438 the ECJ ruled that Mr. Haim was entitled to
enrol and consequently, the GAD had breached his freedom of
establishment. 439 However, instead of adhering to the social security
scheme, Mr. Haim brought an action before a German court asking for
compensation for the loss of earnings against the GAD. 440 The German
court sought a preliminary reference from the ECJ, asking whether the
principle of state liability could be extended to public-law bodies such as
the GAD. 44 1 The ECJ answered in the affirmative, stressing that
"[m]ember [s]tates cannot, therefore, escape that liability ...by claiming
that the public authority responsible for the breach of EU law did not
442
have the necessary powers, knowledge, means or resources."
Therefore, even in cases where the infringing public authorities cannot
financially cover the claims for damages, member states would still
remain liable.
In the same way, though it is true that the ECJ can limit the
temporal effects of its rulings,443 it has held that the financial
repercussions for the state treasuries are not by themselves sufficient to
justify such limitation. 44 In its opinion, since serious infringements of
EU law usually produce the most significant financial implications for
member states, limiting the effects of its rulings solely on financial
grounds would lead to a paradoxical outcome, namely a lenient treatment
434. For a more recent example, see Case C-470/03, A.G.M.-COS.MET Sri v.
Suomen valtio, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2749 (rejecting that national law could deny the award of
loss of profit as a head of damage).
7-9.
435. See Haim, 2000 E.C.R.
436. See id. 10.
437. See id. 12.
438. See Case C-319/92, Haim v. Kassenzahmirztliche Vereinigung Nordrhein, 1994
E.C.R. 1-425.
439. See id.
23-29.
440. See Haim, 2000 E.C.R. 9 13-14.
441. See id. T 14.
442. Id. 28.
443. Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Socit6 anonyme beige de navigation adrienne
Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455, 9 69-75.
444. See Case C-209/03, The Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, 2005 E.C.R. I2119.
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of the most serious violations. 4 5 In effect, the message of the ECJ is
quite clear: "to limit the effects of a judgment solely on the basis of such
considerations would considerably diminish the judicial protection of the
rights which taxpayers have under EU fiscal legislation.
As a matter
of fact, the ECJ prefers to rely on the principle of legal certainty to limit
the retroactive effects of its rulings. Particularly, it requires parties
concerned to have acted in good faith and the presence of serious
difficulties. 4 7
Although it is true that in specific circumstances,
repercussions for the state treasuries have been considered as "serious
difficulties," the requirement of good faith has been equally taken into
account by the ECJ.448
Therefore, the financial repercussions for the state treasuries are not
a sufficient reason to justify limiting either retrospective relief or the
non-retroactivity of the ECJ's rulings. As a result, the ECJ does not need
to decide to which remedy state resources are allocated. Neither does the
ECJ need to endorse the effectiveness of one remedy to the detriment of
the other.449 Judicial protection is seen as a whole, with both remedies
contributing on an equal footing.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

Even though both Courts have given opposite answers to question
of state liability arising from breach of federal/EU law, one can draw
some parallels between the two. First, both principles have been
interpreted extensively. Cases such as College Savings Bank (rejection
of implied waiver), FloridaPrepaid(strict interpretation of Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment), Seminole Tribe (Congressional Plenary
Powers under Article I cannot override this principle), and Alden

445. Case C-367/93, Roders BV v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1995
E.C.R. 1-2229, 46-50; see also Case C- 137/94, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Health
ex parte Richardson, 1995 E.C.R. 1-3407; Case C-197/94, Soci~t6 Bautiaa v. Directeur
des Services Fiscaux des Landes, 1996 E.C.R. 1-505.
446. Roders, 1995 E.C.R. 48.
447. See Case
C-437/97,
Evangelischer
Krankenhausverein
Wien
v.
Abgabenberufungskommission Wien, 2000 E.C.R. 1-1157.
448. Case C-209/03, The Queen v. London Borough of Ealing, 2005 E.C.R. 1-2119,

67-69.
449. Besides, in contrast to the U.S. Supreme Court, the absence of a competing view
on remedies in the EU has led the ECJ to recently indicate that "in the event of a breach
of EU law, EU law does not preclude an official from being held liable in addition to the
member state, but does not require this." Case C-470/03, A.G.M.-COS.MET Sri v.
Suomen valtio, 2007 E.C.R. 1-2749, 99. There is no point, therefore, in asking whether
state or personal liability is the best option to secure the supremacy of federal law.
Because state liability is seen as a remedy securing a minimum threshold of judicial
protection, additional and supplemental remedies are thus welcomed. Notwithstanding
due regard to national procedural autonomy, the more remedies there are, the better.
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(extension to this principle to state courts) demonstrate that the principle
of state sovereign immunity has gained importance in the American
constitutional landscape to the detriment of other constitutional
principles, in particular, the supremacy of federal law. In the same way,
Brasserie du Pecheur (universality of the principle), Hedley Lomas
(discretion is determined by reference to EU law), Haim II (irrelevance
of economic considerations) evince that the ruling of the ECJ in
Francovich was not a shy statement, but the enouncement of a general
principle of EU law.
Second, either where an individual brings an action for damages
against a member state under EU law or where an individual decides to
sue a state official under Section 1983, the mere breach of EU/federal
law does not per se give rise to reparation. In fact, both Courts have laid
down a similar threshold of liability which requires the element offault,
understood not as intentions, but as an expected objective behaviour.
Finally, both federal systems have a centralised model of enforcing
federal/EU law. As previously mentioned, the United States can bring
proceedings against infringing States on the sole ground of enforcing a
private right. Likewise, under ex Article 226 EC (now 258 TFEU), the
commission can decide to start proceedings against an infringing
member state for failure to fulfil its obligations under the EC Treaty
(now replaced by the FEU Treaty).
However, despite these few points in common, the truth is that
major differences persist. Indeed, in spite of the similar threshold of
liability under EU law and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the principles
governing the quantum could not be further apart. Whereas under the
ECJ case law member states would be precluded from arbitrarily capping
compensation, not only do American states enjoy discretion as to the
amount that they decide to cover, but they may also refuse to insure their
officials. Therefore, while Section 1983 allows states to accommodate
officials' liability to their budgetary policy and not to an optimal degree
of deterrence, the principle of state liability excludes any possibility of
limiting compensation. According to the ECJ, compensation must be full
and effective, and thus, member states have little discretion as to the
amount that they want to pay.450
The Courts' opposite approach is due, on the one hand, to structural
differences between the European and American federal design and on
the other hand, to the interaction between remedies and the state
treasuries. The principle of commandeering entails that the effectiveness
450. See A.G.M., 2007 E.C.R
87-98. For an analogical application, see Case C271/91, Marshall v. Southampton & South-West Hampshire Area Health Auth., 1993
E.C.R. 1-4367.
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of EU law depends, to a great extent, on the observance of EU
commands (directives). Hence, in order to reinforce these commands,
the ECJ considered that state liability was a necessary excipient. In other
words, state liability could be seen as the appropriate answer to a
structural need. Conversely, since the U.S. Constitution precludes the
United States from relying on the States as agents, it is for the federal
government alone to implement federal law. State intervention is not
needed to secure the effectiveness of federal law. Likewise, Kobler is a
possible answer to the fact that the EC Treaty (now replaced by the FEU
Treaty) does not grant the ECJ with an appellate jurisdiction over
national courts' decisions. Nor does it provide private parties with
remedies for violations of ex Article 234, third indent, EC (now Article
267, third indent, TFEU) committed by national courts of last instance.
Thus, state liability for judicial acts appears to be a remedial solution to a
structural gap. It creates a defacto appeal which is capable of submitting
the highest national courts to the mandates of an incipient Supreme Court
of the European Union. On the contrary, because the U.S. Supreme
Court has appellate jurisdiction to review the consistency of state court
decisions with the U.S. Constitution and federal law, additional means
are not necessary to secure its authority.
Moreover, because the U.S. Supreme Court is keen on protecting
the state treasuries, the judiciary is forced to choose between past
remedies and future rights. This antagonism is solved in favour of
prospective remedies which are deemed to favour constitutional
innovation. On the contrary, since the state treasuries are not taken into
consideration by the ECJ's rationale, retrospective and prospective relief
are seen as complementary and supplementary remedies.
As a result, state liability in damages is a monetary remedy which
illustrates the way in which the principle of primacy/supremacy of
EU/federal law operates in a constitutional legal order. In this sense, as
the American and European examples demonstrate, primacy or
supremacy can be understood in two different ways.
In Europe, the principle of primacy of EU law is intrinsically linked
to the dictum ubijus' ibi remedium. Thus, primacy is respected in so far
as for every violation of EU law, there is a correlative remedy. The
strength of primacy amounts to the indissolubility of the binomial "rightremedy." In addition, the fact that there are already in place other
remedies is not an obstacle to create new ones more effective. The more
suitable the remedies are, the better protected rights are and
consequently, the more enhanced the primacy of EU law is. In this
regard, the principle of state liability clearly demonstrates the foregoing.
At first, it was relied upon by the ECJ in order to cover a remedial gap.
Later, taking the view that liability for damages was the most adequate
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instrument to solve past violations of EU law, the ECJ upheld its
universal application.
On the contrary, in America, the supremacy of federal law is
interpreted as the capacity of submitting component States to the rule of
law. Hence, the supremacy of federal law is respected where remedies
are able to secure state compliance with federal law, regardless of
whether past violations of federal rights remain unsolved. It follows that
where alternative remedies (such as suits brought by the federal
government, suits against state officials or the Ex-Parte Young Doctrine)
are sufficient to ensure observance of federal law, state liability for
damages is not necessary. As Alden demonstrates, remedial gaps or
remedial inadequacy do not inter alia put into question that federal law is
the "supreme law of the land." Thus, whereas in Europe, primacy of EU
law and judicial protection walk hand-to-hand, in America, it is not
always the case.

